University of Michigan Law School

University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2020

The Cost of Novelty
Will Nicholson Price II

University of Michigan Law School, wnp@umich.edu

Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/2167

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Food and Drug Law Commons, Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Public Law
and Legal Theory Commons

Recommended Citation
Price, W. Nicholson, II. "The Cost of Novelty." Colum. L. Rev. 119, no. 8 (2020): 769-833.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

ESSAY
THE COST OF NOVELTY
W. Nicholson Price II *
Patent law tries to spur the development of new and better innovative technology. But it focuses much more on “new” than “better”—and
it turns out that “new” carries real social costs. I argue that patent law
promotes innovation that diverges from existing technology, either a little
(what I call “diﬀerentiating innovation”) or a lot (“exploring innovation”), at the expense of innovation that tells us more about existing
technology (“deepening innovation”). Patent law’s focus on newness is
unsurprising, and fits within a well-told narrative of innovative diversity
accompanied by market selection of the best technologies. Unfortunately,
innovative diversity brings not only the potential benefits of technological
advances but also the costs: incompatibility between diﬀerent technologies; a spread-out, shallow pool of knowledge; and the underlying costs
of developing parallel technologies that aren’t actually better. These costs
matter.
Biomedical innovation illustrates the high costs of divergence. Although pharmaceuticals are touted as a poster child for patents, the world
is rife with me-too drugs that drive up costs with little to show for it.
Biomedical innovation often suﬀers from a particular trap: Patent incentives push innovators toward “new,” but incentives from Food and Drug
Administration approval and insurer reimbursement push innovators
toward “not too new.” In this space, artificially constricted markets do a
poor job of selecting better technologies. The result is a proliferation of
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technologies that are “new for the sake of new,” giving us the costs of
divergence without much in the way of benefits.
This Essay presents an original spectrum of innovative divergence,
illuminates how various patent doctrines drive divergence, and lays out
the substantial costs of divergence through biomedical examples. It
analyzes the complex interactions between three diﬀerent incentives for
biomedical innovation and presents policy prescriptions to help avoid the
trap of “new for the sake of new.” In the process, it lays out how innovation scholars and policymakers alike should take into account the cost of
novelty.
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INTRODUCTION
Patent law promotes innovations that are diﬀerent from what the
world already knows. This may seem a truism: What is innovation other
than the search for new things?1 But mere novelty is not the aim of innovation policy—improvement is. Put more plainly, what we want is “better”;
what we get is “new.” Often, in fact, we get innovations that are new purely
for the sake of being new, and not better at all. Sometimes they are worse.
This Essay explores how patent law promotes what I call divergent innovation—innovation that develops significant or minor changes to existing
technology rather than learning more about that technology—drawing
from examples in the field of biomedical innovation.
Patent law can drive divergent innovation even when other incentives
suggest focusing on developing an older technology. Known drugs provide
a useful case. If a known chemical would make an eﬀective drug, companies typically still won’t develop it, because it isn’t new, and therefore, isn’t
patentable.2 Instead, they may make minor changes (or seek out a totally
diﬀerent chemical), even if those changes might make the drug worse,
because the patent incentive is so important to the innovative process.3
Patent doctrines focus incentives on the search for new and diﬀerent
innovation without emphasizing improving technology or increasing welfare. Novelty, nonobviousness, and utility doctrines all drive innovations’
newness when innovators seek patent protection.4 And in a mirror image
of patent incentives to create new innovations, innovators “invent around”

1. Innovation policy scholars often distinguish invention—the process of creating a
new technology—from innovation—the process of commercializing a new invention. See,
e.g., Yale Brozen, Invention, Innovation, and Imitation, 41 Am. Econ. Rev. 239, 239 (1951).
I use innovation here to describe the entire process, assuming a unified innovator whose
inventive and commercialization eﬀorts are driven by a desire to profit from the innovation.
2. See Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standard of Patentability, 87
Tex. L. Rev. 503, 513 (2009) [hereinafter Roin, Unpatentable Drugs] (“[I]t is well known
that pharmaceutical companies generally refuse to develop new drugs unless they have
strong patent protections over them.”); infra section II.A.1. New use patents may be available
but provide relatively weak incentives. See infra section II.A.1; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
The Problem of New Uses, 5 Yale J. Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 717, 724–25 (2005) [hereinafter
Eisenberg, New Uses] (describing the limited incentives provided by new use patents); Erika
Lietzan, Paper Promises for Drug Innovation, 26 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 168, 182–95 (2018)
(arguing that protections for new uses are inadequate).
3. See infra section III.A.
4. While the title of this Essay refers to “novelty,” it addresses newness in general, not
just the novelty doctrine of patent law.
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patents on existing technology not because inventing around will improve
a product but to avoid the cost imposed by existing patents.5
Divergent innovation may bring benefits, but it also brings costs that
diﬀer from the cost of patent exclusivity itself. I identify three here. First,
the process of inventing around existing patents is itself costly. To develop
a new drug similar to an existing drug, the developer needs to undergo
the entire process of preclinical work, clinical trials, and Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) approval, at a cost of many millions of dollars.
Second, divergent innovation can lead to incompatible technologies, the
absence of standards, and the loss of network eﬀects and economies of
scale. Third, when the path of innovation is deliberately forked, we lose
the ability to draw from existing stocks of knowledge about a particular
technology because the new technology is diﬀerent for the sake of being
diﬀerent. Those new clinical trials mean that we know less about both the
new drug and the old drug than we would have known if we had simply
developed more knowledge about the old drug. Even when divergent
innovation eﬀectively moves technology forward, the costs of divergent
innovation should be weighed against its benefits.6
The costs of divergent innovation have gone understudied partly
because divergence fits so neatly within a patent-driven market theory of
innovation. Patent law relies on the market to sort out the value of inventions. Patents are only worthwhile if the protected goods are valuable in
the marketplace, so the market will work to sort out the valuable innovations from a mélange of patented inventions.7 As John Duﬀy puts it,
“[P]atent law has no aversion to awarding commercially worthless property rights.”8 But firms, with their private knowledge about markets and
consumers, can predict market value (to some extent), and use that information to drive their innovation investment decisions. Under this account,
while patent law does not require superiority for individual inventions,9
patent law and markets together should lead to overall improvements over
time.
Unfortunately, markets aren’t always great at identifying innovating
improvements. Consumers select goods for many reasons besides quality.10
5. See infra section III.B.
6. Patent law creates these costs by prioritizing divergent innovation, as I argue here,
but these costs are not dependent on patent law; if a grant system or prize system similarly
promoted technological divergence, the same sorts of divergence costs would arise.
7. Note that while patent law permits the patenting of useless new things, see infra
section II.A.3, it does not permit the patenting of useful old things, see infra section II.A.1.
8. John F. Duﬀy, Rethinking the Prospect Theory of Patents, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 439,
453 (2004).
9. See infra section II.A.3.
10. See, e.g., Jake Linford, Placebo Marks, 47 Pepp. L. Rev. 45, 53–62 (2019)
(explaining how trademarks can drive economically irrational consumer behavior but can
also alter consumer experience of the branded product); Irina D. Manta, Hedonic Trademarks,
74 Ohio St. L.J. 241, 264–66 (2013) (describing how brand names can contribute to consumers’ hedonic experiences of goods). For additional information, see generally Deborah
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We might therefore expect the costs of divergence—the source of the
variety from which markets pick the winners—to be more problematic
where market mechanisms do a poor job of incentivizing, selecting, and
adopting superior innovations.
Markets are especially bad at selecting superior biomedical technologies. Efficient markets require informed consumers who can choose goods.
But biomedical technologies, which make up a trillion-dollar annual industry with tremendous health implications, are often “credence goods,”
meaning that their users cannot evaluate the innovations’ quality independently.11 Even with FDA regulation, information about biomedical
technologies’ quality is frequently poor or unavailable.12 Finally, patients,
doctors, and insurers split the consumer functions of selecting, paying for,
and benefiting from goods, each with their own incentives. Since market
mechanisms for selecting superior technologies underperform for biomedical innovations, the costs of divergent innovation matter more. These
costs are particularly significant because biomedical technology encompasses drugs, which are presented as the exemplar of an industry where
patents are truly important and work as designed.13
Patents create incentives within a broader innovation ecosystem,
where some policy tools, like patents, promote divergence, but others discourage innovators from diverging. For biomedical technology, consider
two among many:14 Market approval by FDA and health insurer reimbursement decisions each create substantial innovation incentives. Each can
penalize divergence. At FDA, specialized processes ease market access for
new medical devices that resemble existing devices; if the technology is
substantially diﬀerent, getting premarket approval can be much harder.15
Similarly, winning insurer reimbursement for a new technology is easier if
the insurer is familiar with the technology, such that the innovator need
not make their case from scratch.16 The interaction between these incentive
J. MacInnis, C. Whan Park & Joseph R. Priester, Handbook of Brand Relationships (2019)
(describing relationships between consumers and brands).
11. Ariel Dora Stern, Innovation Under Regulatory Uncertainty: Evidence from Medical
Technology, 145 J. Pub. Econ. 181, 182 (2017). The nature of health technology as a credence good, among other factors, drives the need for FDA regulation. See id. at 183–84; see
also Stephen Breyer, Regulation and Its Reform 26–29 (1982) (using drugs as an example
to argue that information failures can justify regulation).
12. See infra section III.D.2.
13. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs, supra note 2, at 504.
14. Other levers could and should be considered in future work. Prestigious journals,
for instance, prioritize novel, surprising results over confirmations or refinements of existing work; government grants may go either to new research pathways or to existing areas
with which grant reviewers are comfortable. See generally John P.A. Ioannidis, Why Most
Published Research Findings Are False, 2 PLoS Med. 696 (2005) (discussing publication
incentives); W. Nicholson Price II, Grants, 34 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1 (2019) [hereinafter Price,
Grants] (discussing grant incentives).
15. See infra section IV.A.
16. See infra section IV.B.
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systems can lead to bad outcomes: Patent incentives pushing for newness
can be partially counterbalanced by reimbursement and regulatory incentives pushing against too much newness, resulting in a spate of technologies that are diﬀerent enough to bring the costs of divergence, without
being suﬃciently diﬀerent to bring substantial benefits.
Good innovation policy depends on understanding innovation, and
the costs of divergence are a part of that. This Essay makes a general claim:
Patent law drives divergent innovation, and that divergence carries costs.
As to this picture of innovation in general, the only prescription I oﬀer is
that scholars and policymakers take divergence costs into account when
analyzing innovation incentives, benefits, and costs.
This Essay also makes a specific claim: Divergence is especially costly
for biomedical innovations, which patents and other incentives can drive
toward an unhappy medium of diﬀerentiating, proliferating, nonsuperior
technologies. This specific problem may be amenable to solutions. Within
patent law, strengthening the nonobviousness requirement could reduce
close imitators of existing technology. Outside patent law, FDA or insurer
requirements for superiority could do the same.
This Essay proceeds in five Parts. Part I describes the ways in which
innovation paths can diverge or not. Part II lays out how several patent
doctrines can drive divergent innovation. Part III provides three cases to
illustrate divergent innovation and the costs it can bring: me-too drugs,
including statins; insulin pumps for diabetics; and epinephrine autoinjectors like the EpiPen. Part IV places patent law into a broader context
in the case of biomedical innovation, addressing how the incentives provided by FDA approval and insurer reimbursement can drive innovation
to follow the path of existing technology. It also considers how these
combined incentives can perversely lead to innovation landing in an
unhappy middle: close enough to existing technology that we derive little
social benefit from diversity but far enough from that technology that we
see the costs of divergence. Part V describes potential solutions to the
problems specific to biomedical innovation, located either within or
outside patent doctrine.
I. DEGREES OF DIVERGENT INNOVATION
Consider the cases of three potential innovators.
Jenn heads a firm focused on allergy medications.17 She wants to
improve the field of epinephrine (a.k.a. adrenaline) auto-injectors that are
used in emergencies by patients with severe allergies, a field currently

17. Firm size and composition aﬀect innovation eﬀorts. See generally Dan L. Burk,
Intellectual Property and the Firm, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 3 (2004) (discussing the interactions
between intellectual property and theories of the firm). I set aside these fascinating issues
here, assuming innovators face similar firm structures. Adding firm complexities would, of
course, further complicate the picture.
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dominated by the EpiPen.18 The EpiPen saves lives, but user error causes
problems: Sometimes people get the ends mixed up and inject the epinephrine into their thumbs when they’re trying to use the device.19 It’s also
currently mired in scandal because its price has quadrupled over seven
years.20 Jenn considers three possible options. She can try to develop a
more eﬃcient manufacturing process for the EpiPen with the goal of
lowering its price. She can try to make a new auto-injector that’s essentially
the same as the EpiPen but just a little diﬀerent—perhaps it has two safety
caps where the EpiPen has one. Or she can try to make something that’s
quite diﬀerent—a diﬀerent overall design to reduce the risk of thumbsticking, and perhaps other substantial changes.
Michelle runs a drug company with expertise in statins, drugs used to
reduce high cholesterol. She can choose to develop new information about
an existing blockbuster statin, Lipitor, identifying new dosing regimens or
new data about eﬀects in diﬀerent populations. She can try to develop
another statin that reduces high cholesterol. Or she can pursue some new
anticholesterol drug target.
Finally, Martin runs a medical device company. He is developing a new
line of insulin pumps and is considering what connector to use to link the
pumps to insulin reservoirs. He can use the existing, industry-standard
technology, incorporating it into the new line. He can tweak the existing
technology to work slightly better for the new line. Or he can develop a
new connector designed specifically for the new line of pumps.
We can think of the three options faced by innovators as, roughly,
learning more about the existing technology (“deepening”), pursuing
minor variations on the existing technology (“diﬀerentiating”), or moving
further afield from the existing technology toward something markedly
diﬀerent (“exploring”).21 The latter two are forms of divergent innovation.
In diﬀerentiating innovation, an invention can be trivially diﬀerent from
what came before, perhaps just “new for the sake of new.” In exploring
innovation, inventions take a larger step away from what came before.
Either change may be good or bad; the size of the change says nothing
about whether it is an improvement, a worsening, or neither.

18. See infra section III.D.1.
19. Ceara McNeil & Julie Copeland, Accidental Digital Epinephrine Injection: To Treat
or Not to Treat?, 60 Canadian Fam. Physician 726, 726 (2014).
20. See Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, The Untold EpiPen Story: How Mylan
Hiked Prices by Blocking Rivals, 102 Cornell L. Rev. Online 53, 53 (2017).
21. See infra Table 1.
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TABLE 1: DIFFERENT POTENTIAL INNOVATIONS
Nondivergent

Divergent

Deepening

Diﬀerentiating

Exploring

Allergies

Improve EpiPen
manufacturing

Slightly
modify EpiPen

Develop a new formfactor auto-injector

Statins

Identify new Lipitor
dosing regimen

Develop a new
statin

Pursue a diﬀerent
anti-cholesterol drug

Insulin

Adopt the existing
connector

Tweak the
connector

Develop a new
connector

This typology of innovation divergence sits to some degree at the
intersection of broad literatures on cumulative innovation and product
diﬀerentiation. Cumulative innovation is the process by which innovation
builds on earlier innovation; Suzanne Scotchmer and others have explored patent law’s impact on cumulative innovation in some depth.22
Product diﬀerentiation, on the other hand, focuses on the various ways
that firms diﬀerentiate their products for consumers, whether based on
quality, branding, price, or otherwise.23 Although I borrow insights from
each field throughout this Essay, I ultimately do not adopt either’s framework. Instead, I focus on the ways that a new technology can diﬀer from
older technology, the degrees of those diﬀerences, and how patent law and
other incentives interact with the process of divergent innovation.

22. See, e.g., Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative
Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. Econ. Persp. 29, 30–40 (1991) (modeling cumulative innovation and patent law’s impact on it); see also, e.g., Christopher Buccafusco, Stefan Bechtold
& Christopher Jon Sprigman, The Nature of Sequential Innovation, 59 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
1, 57–58 (2017) (describing the incentives of creators to “build on” versus “build around”
prior intellectual property and discussing the diﬀerence between “tweaking” and “pioneering” innovation); Arti K. Rai, Fostering Cumulative Innovation in the Biopharmaceutical
Industry: The Role of Patents and Antitrust, 16 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 813, 838–44 (2001)
(describing how patents and antitrust can help or hinder cumulative innovation).
23. See, e.g., Erin Parrish, Retailers’ Use of Niche Marketing in Product Development,
14 J. Fashion Marketing & Mgmt. 546, 546–47 (2010) (describing methods of product diﬀerentiation and their benefits to industry).
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FIGURE 1: DEEPENING, DIFFERENTIATING, AND EXPLORING INNOVATION

Deepening, diﬀerentiating, and exploring innovation are not sharply
delineated, nor will any particular innovation fit neatly into only one category.24 The boundary between diﬀerentiating and exploring innovation is
often particularly fuzzy; these are labels along a spectrum of divergence
rather than distinct classes. Exploring or diﬀerentiating innovation can
also lead to increased knowledge about the existing technology: When you
try to change a product substantially, you may learn more about how it
works now, and when you make minor variations, you might learn more
about how to manufacture it. Nevertheless, these three general classes can
help us think about the types of innovation that innovators might pursue.
In each of the three cases described above, any of the options could
be best for social welfare.25 Society might be better oﬀ with more cheaply
manufactured EpiPens, better information about how Lipitor works, or
increased adoption of the insulin pump interface (deepening). But it
might just as well be better oﬀ getting a really diﬀerent epinephrine autoinjector, a new drug in a new class, or a connector that is more secure
(exploring). In the middle (diﬀerentiating), society might benefit from
small variations in existing technology through, for instance, increased
competition or small improvements. To the extent that diﬀerentiating and
exploring innovation both bring the costs discussed in Part III, one might
expect that deepening innovation (which doesn’t have those costs) and
exploring innovation (which has the potential for bigger performance
breakthroughs) will often be more desirable than diﬀerentiating innovation, but that conclusion is certainly not a given in any instance. Specific
answers will involve tradeoffs between knowledge breadth and depth, interoperability and improvements, competition and diﬀerentiation, and other
values. Finding the right answer won’t always be straightforward.
But patent law has a favorite answer. Patent law creates incentives for
innovators to pursue pathways that are diﬀerent from what has come
before, whether diﬀerentiating or exploring. Its various doctrines make
24. See supra Figure 1.
25. It would be nice to have all these innovations, of course, but I assume limited
innovator resources.
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patents available only for new inventions and substantially limit patents’
ability to promote developing new information about old inventions.26 In
addition, the exclusivity created by earlier patents limits the ability of later
inventors to practice the earlier invention without paying a license or facing the risk of infringement liability.27 Thus, innovators choosing between
diﬀerent possible forms of innovation will be driven, at least by patent law,
to pursue paths diverging from existing knowledge.
Patent law’s preference for novelty exists even when we do know what’s
socially best, and even when it’s not a divergent path. Jenn may be certain
(and right) that auto-injectors will be best advanced by improving EpiPen
manufacturing. Or Martin may be certain (and right) that new proprietary
connectors would create negative eﬀects by locking consumers into existing platforms, and that these negative eﬀects would swamp the benefits
from most technological advances.28 And the all-too-common failure of
scientific results to hold up over time suggests that simply replicating existing studies—perhaps the most straightforward form of deepening innovation—would substantially benefit society.29 Patent law will nevertheless
create incentives to pursue the divergent path.30 The next section explores
the purpose of patent law and the doctrines by which it creates incentives
for divergent innovation.

26. See infra section II.A.
27. See infra section II.B.
28. Cf. Melissa A. Schilling, Technological Lockout: An Integrative Model of the Economic
and Strategic Factors Driving Technology Success and Failure, 23 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 267,
267–69 (1998) (explaining how “technological lockout” occurs (1) when firms “produce[]
products representing or conforming to a technological standard that is subsequently
rejected by the market” and (2) when “there is an existing dominant design and the firm is
unable to . . . produc[e] or sell[] products conforming to this standard”).
29. See Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Law’s Reproducibility Paradox, 66 Duke L.J. 845, 882–
902 (2017) [hereinafter Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox] (describing the failure of many
patented drugs to actually work in practice).
30. Many other incentives also apply. For FDA approval and reimbursement, especially
relevant in biomedical innovation, see infra Part IV. Patent law itself may not be the dominant form of incentive for technology, especially in an academic context. See generally, e.g.,
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research and Private Development: Patents and Technology
Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 Va. L. Rev. 1663 (1996) (describing innovation incentives in government-sponsored research); Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg,
Bayh-Dole Reform and the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 Law & Contemp. Probs. 289, 289–
91 (2003) (describing the erosion of open science norms after the Bayh–Dole Act); Arti
Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of
Science, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 77 (1999) (describing the tension between scientific norms and
intellectual property’s exclusivity mechanism). Patent law’s incentives are also substantially
diﬀerent in the software space. See generally, Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope
and Innovation in the Software Industry, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1 (2001) (providing an overview of
this space); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Patentable Subject Matter and Nonpatent Innovation
Incentives, 5 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 1115, 1137–41 (2015) (describing limits on software patents
and the availability of other incentives).
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II. HOW PATENT LAW PROMOTES DIVERGENT INNOVATION
Patent law aims to promote innovation. The Constitution authorizes
Congress “[t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries.”31 But what does this mean? What are
patents really supposed to do?
Four major theories justify patent law.32 Incentive theory—by far the
dominant theory—responds to the status of new, costly ideas as public
goods33 on which competitors can free-ride.34 Firms want to make money;
why invest in innovation if competitors can swoop in and compete without
making that costly initial investment? Incentive theory argues that patents
can provide exclusivity, allowing innovators to reap supracompetitive market returns and creating ex ante incentives to innovate.35 Disclosure theory
takes as a given that innovation will happen but oﬀers patents as a reward
to innovators to share their inventions with the world rather than keeping
them secret.36 Commercialization theory argues that patents induce companies to expend the eﬀort to take inventions from early stages to commercial products.37 Finally, prospect theory argues that patents, especially early
patents, enable initial innovators to orchestrate the many eﬀorts to develop later innovative products from that initial innovation.38 Each theory has
received substantial criticism39 and different theories appear to predominate
31. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
32. See, e.g., Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, Economic Theories About the
Benefits and Costs of Patents, 32 J. Econ. Issues 1031, 1033 (1998).
33. Public goods are nonrivalrous (I can possess your idea without diminishing your
possession of the idea) and nonexcludable (once an idea is available, it’s hard to keep others
from knowing/using it). See, e.g., Molly McLure Wasko, Robin Teigland & Samer Faraj, The
Provision of Online Public Goods: Examining Social Structure in an Electronic Network of
Practice, 47 Decision Support Sys. 254, 255 (2009) (defining public goods).
34. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights
and Experimental Use, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1017, 1024–25 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Progress
of Science] (describing free-riding by competitors).
35. Id. at 1024–26 (describing the incentive theory of patents).
36. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 539, 551 (2009); Lisa Larrimore
Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 545, 556–57
(2012) [hereinafter Ouellette, Useful Information].
37. See generally F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 Minn. L. Rev. 697 (2000) (describing commercialization theory); Ted Sichelman,
Commercializing Patents, 62 Stan. L. Rev. 341 (2010) (proposing a new type of patent focused on commercialization).
38. See generally Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System,
20 J.L. Econ. 265 (1977) (proposing prospect theory).
39. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual
Property, 71 U. Chi. L. Rev. 129, 135–41 (2004) (critiquing the commercialization and prospect theories); Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 32, at 1037 (noting the dearth of empirical
evidence for any theory except the incentive theory); Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents
Aﬀect Research Investments?, 9 Ann. Rev. Econ. 441, 448–56 (2017) (noting that empirical
evidence on the incentive theory remains unclear).
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in diﬀerent contexts.40 All the theories, however, share the aim of promoting the “progress of science and useful arts” by helping innovators develop
new, better technologies. Nevertheless, because it is hard to identify “better” technologies in advance, the identification of better technologies
typically comes about ex post, through market selection of technologies,
and ex ante, through firms selecting which innovations to pursue based
on private knowledge about market preferences.41
Patent law, like all forms of IP law, aims to promote innovation but
does not create incentives for all forms of innovative knowledge that we
value, nor for all forms of innovation that suﬀer from public goods problems.42 Market value, on which IP law relies, systematically values some
goods diﬀerently than a social planner or a committee of scientists might,43
and some types of market-valued innovation are diﬃcult to protect and
therefore incentivize. Amy Kapczynski and Talha Syed cut across patentjustification theories to point out that patent law promotes only innovation that can be protected through patent law’s excludability mechanism;
40. For instance, the Bayh–Dole Act, which allows universities to patent federally funded inventions, was expressly motivated by commercialization and development theory. See
Mazzoleni & Nelson, supra note 32, at 1040–41 (noting the incompatibility of the Bayh–Dole
Act with an incentive theory of patents).
41. See Nancy Gallini & Suzanne Scotchmer, Intellectual Property: When Is It the Best
Innovation System?, 2 Innovation Pol’y & Econ. 51, 54–56 (2002) (noting the preferability
of patents when private firms have information about market preferences); Daniel J. Hemel
& Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Beyond the Patents–Prizes Debate, 92 Tex. L. Rev. 303, 327
(2013) [hereinafter Hemel & Ouellette, Beyond the Debate] (noting patents’ function of
aggregating private information about demand for innovations).
42. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection
of Works of Information, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1865, 1895–1900 (1990) (describing copyright’s
rejection of “sweat of the brow” as suﬃcient justification for authorship); Jane C. Ginsburg,
No “Sweat”? Copyright and Other Protection of Works of Information After Feist v. Rural
Telephone, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 338, 338–41 (1992) (same); Price, Grants, supra note 14, at 41–
63 (discussing gaps in IP incentives that can be addressed through the grant system); Jerome
H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 Vand. L. Rev.
51, 61–63 (1997) (describing how IP law does provide useful protections for data); cf. Jessica
Silbey, The Eureka Myth: Creators, Innovators, and Everyday Intellectual Property 10–11
(2014) (describing how intellectual property does not account for things that creators
actually need). For applications to biomedical innovation, see, e.g., Eisenberg, New Uses,
supra note 2, at 717–20 (describing inadequate incentives to find new uses for drugs); W.
Nicholson Price II, Big Data, Patents, and the Future of Medicine, 37 Cardozo L. Rev. 1401,
1406–07 (2016) (discussing the absence of intellectual property protection for health data—
aside from trade secrecy—and the problems that absence creates); Jacob S. Sherkow,
Cancer’s IP, 96 N.C. L. Rev. 297, 302–04 (2018) (discussing the inadequate incentives provided by IP to invest in modern cancer research).
43. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Cost of Price: Why and How to Get Beyond Intellectual
Property Internalism, 59 UCLA L. Rev. 970, 999–1000 (2012) (explaining how IP’s focus on
price prevents it from encouraging distributive justice); see also, e.g., Camilla A. Hrdy, State
Patents as a Solution to Underinvestment in Innovation, 62 U. Kan. L. Rev. 487, 509–10
(2013) (arguing for state agency valuation of innovation); Price, Grants, supra note 14, at
63–64 (“[T]he aggregation of scientific knowledge and priorities—with input from the government as to social benefit—is not inferior to determinations that arise from private market
aggregation of private knowledge; it’s just diﬀerent.”).
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nonexcludable innovation, like negative information or eﬃciency checklists, receives few patent incentives.44 This Essay takes a similar cross-cutting
tack: Much as patent law’s excludability mechanism promotes the production of excludable knowledge, its focus on diﬀerence promotes the
development of divergent innovation rather than deepening innovation
that increases knowledge about existing products.
Patent law and policy are explicit about promoting divergent innovation. The former Chairman of the Department of Commerce’s Patent
Survey Committee elaborated this goal of divergence in testimony before
Congress:
The effect of the patent system . . . is to force diversity. A is a
manufacturer of can openers; B is a competitor. B comes along
with a new type of can opener. He gets a patent on it. A can’t copy
it, but he still has to stay in the can-opener business, so he gets
busy and gets himself up some new type of can opener, and it is
usually a little better than B’s.45
Of course, this example assumes that a consumer can tell that the new can
opener is better, so that markets can help drive progress—an assumption
that often does not hold true, especially for biomedical products.46
Patent law creates incentives for divergent innovation in two principal
ways. First, patentability doctrines demand diﬀerence; an inventor can patent their invention only if it is novel and nonobvious.47 To the extent that
patents increase the amount of an invention’s value appropriable by the
inventor,48 this will increase the realizable value of inventions that diverge
from what has come before. Utility doctrine also plays a role, not by driving
divergence but by failing to require improvements. Second, diﬀerence can
shield later inventors from needing to pay earlier inventors for infringement.49 Patents grant exclusionary rights; if later inventions fall within the
scope of existing patents covering earlier inventions, the later inventor
must either license the earlier patent or run the risk of infringement liability.50 Innovators who diverge from earlier inventors may be able to avoid
these costs.51

44. Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, The Continuum of Excludability and the Limits of
Patents, 122 Yale L.J. 1900, 1903–06 (2013).
45. Atomic Energy Act of 1946: Hearings on S. 1717 Before the Spec. Comm. on Atomic
Energy, 79th Cong. 61 (1946) (statement of William H. Davis, Former Director, Oﬃce of
Economic Stabilization, and Former Chairman, War Labor Board).
46. See supra notes 10–12 and accompanying text.
47. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102–103 (2012).
48. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Progress of Science, supra note 34, at 1024–26 (describing how
patents increase the appropriability of inventions’ value).
49. See Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 29–30.
50. See id. at 30–32. The later inventor may still be able to obtain a patent on the later
invention, in which case each patentee could prevent the other from using the later technology until the first patent expired.
51. See id.
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Patentability

Three patentability doctrines promote divergent innovation.52 The
most straightforward are the novelty and nonobviousness requirements,
which enshrine patent law’s push toward what is new and diﬀerent. However, the utility requirement also plays a substantial role based on what it
does not do: require that a new invention be better.
1. Novelty. — The novelty requirement explicitly requires divergence.
To be patentable, an invention must be new.53 More precisely, an invention cannot be patented if every element of the invention can be found
within a single prior art reference.54 Patent law creates a broad set of
references known as the “prior art”—essentially, all printed publications,
patents, patent applications, and things that were publicly used or on sale
prior to the date the patent was filed.55 If any single reference within that
set contains every element of the invention claimed in the new patent, the
patent is “anticipated” and cannot be granted (or, if already granted, is
invalid).56 If an innovator wants to patent an invention, they must create
something new. Of course this is unsurprising; a principal purpose of patent
52. Not all patent doctrines promote divergent innovation and not all doctrines cut
clearly in one direction or another. The various disclosure doctrines (enablement, written
description, and definiteness) arguably play minor roles in shaping innovation divergence
as well but do not cut definitively either for or against divergence. For instance, disclosure
requirements may promote divergence during the term of the patent, especially when fuzzy
claim drafting or voluminous specifications lay out broad and unclear barriers for future
inventors to avoid. See Janet Freilich, Patent Clutter, 103 Iowa L. Rev. 925, 936–39 (2018)
(describing fuzzy claims, the diﬃculties of running patent searches, and the costs of drafting
around); Janet Freilich, Prophetic Patents, 53 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 663, 727–28 (2019) (providing summary statistics of voluminous specifications in chemical and biological patents).
To the extent that satisfying enablement is easier when new inventions are closer to existing
inventions, it should promote diﬀerentiating over exploring innovation. However, once patents have expired, the enablement doctrine should make it easier to replicate a patented
invention or engage in deepening innovation; this should also be true during the patent
term but is counterbalanced by the exclusionary force of the patent itself. Finally, the very
fact that the patent term is limited promotes novelty; an innovative monopolist who wishes
to remain a monopolist needs to develop new products as patents expire. See infra section
III.B.2 (discussing pharmaceutical evergreening). This Essay focuses on those doctrines
principally involved in pushing innovation in divergent directions during the patent term.
53. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). To be sure, patents are explicitly available on improvements of existing processes or products. But as described in more detail below, those improvements, if made to a process or product covered by an existing patent, will face costs in
the form of licensing requirements or the likelihood of liability for infringement. See infra
section II.B.
54. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a).
55. Id. The exact timing and contours of the prior art are complex but need not concern us here.
56. Id.; see also W.L. & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1554 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (“Anticipation requires the disclosure in a single prior art reference of each element
of the claim under consideration.”). For a useful analysis of novelty doctrine with respect to
pharmaceuticals, see generally Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 Duke
L.J. 919 (2011) (describing the doctrine, arguing that disclosure of chemicals without more
should not suﬃce to be an anticipatory disclosure, and arguing for a new framework).
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law is to drive the creation and sharing of new ideas.57 Under disclosure
theory, the public should suﬀer the deadweight loss of monopoly only in
exchange for information it did not have before;58 under incentive theory,
innovators need incentives only to develop new technologies, not technologies that already exist.59
Novelty also reduces incentives for deepening innovation. Information about new uses of a known product, or new results of existing processes,
will not make that known product or existing process patentable, although
the new use may itself be patentable.60 Understanding more about an existing process or product—for example, how mixing water with a drug may
avoid toxic explosions61 or the usefulness of a subset of known alloys in
resisting corrosion62—may be tremendously socially valuable. But later
innovators have limited incentives to discover that information. There are
two caveats to this story: incentives for the initial innovator and the possibility of patents on new uses or improvements.
a. Incentives for the Initial Innovator. — The mechanics of novelty
create diﬀerent incentives for initial inventors than for later inventors.
Patents create a largely “winner-take-all” system, in which the first inventor
to patent an invention reaps most of the reward.63 This system is embodied
in the novelty requirement: Once one inventor has won the race to the
patent office, other inventors lose the incentive of market exclusivity.64 This
creates incentives for other inventors to pursue diﬀerent paths and decreases incentives for those inventors to develop socially valuable information about the invention.65
However, a winner-take-all system also gives the initial inventor assurance that they can capture at least some gains from additional investment
57. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Progress of Science, supra note 34, at 1024.
58. See, e.g., id. at 1028–30.
59. See, e.g., id. at 1024–26.
60. Patent law permits inventors to patent the use of an old process to a new end—that
is, to accomplish a new goal—but not the use of a known process toward the same end, even
if the results were previously unrecognized. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs.,
Inc., 246 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Newly discovered results of known processes
directed to the same purpose are not patentable because such results are inherent.”).
61. Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
62. Titanium Metals Corp. of Am. v. Banner, 778 F.2d 775, 780–82 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
63. Vincenzo Denicolò & Luigi A. Franzoni, On the Winner-Take-All Principle in Innovation
Races, 8 J. Eur. Econ. Ass’n 1133, 1133 (2010).
64. For a sampling of the extensive literature on patent racing, see generally, e.g., Duffy,
supra note 8, at 443–45 (arguing that racing may dissipate private rents but may increase
social value because patents filed earlier expire earlier and thus leave the invention to the
public); Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 Va. L. Rev.
305, 307–09 (1992) (noting the risk of dissipating the social returns of innovation through
wasteful patent racing).
65. Cf. Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 2, at 720–25 (describing how patent law disincentivizes investing in research to discover new uses for products); Sherkow, Reproducibility
Paradox, supra note 29, at 847–50 (“[T]he availability of patents . . . appears to hamper or
even actively dissuade reproducibility.”).
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in the patented innovation. If they discover a more eﬃcient way to manufacture a patented drug, or a new use for that drug, they can reap the rewards
from that deepening innovation, at least during the term of the patent.66
For instance, sildenafil (Viagra) was originally patented and tested to treat
hypertension.67 When the drug caused erections in male clinical trial participants, Pfizer switched to testing it to treat erectile dysfunction,68 won
approval,69 and sold billions of dollars of pills for that purpose—all within
the patent term. Sildenafil was subsequently also approved for its original
purpose.70 Both commercialization theory and prospect theory recognize
that creating this protected space can aid commercialization eﬀorts by the
initial inventor.71 Thus, patentees of pioneer inventions may in fact have
incentives, derived partly from the novelty requirement, to engage in deepening innovation.
b. New Use Patents. — Patents on new uses of existing products also
create some incentives for forms of deepening innovation but are limited
in their eﬀectiveness. Patents are available when innovators discover a new
use for an existing product.72 For instance, if a doctor discovers that an old
drug used to treat high blood pressure also treats male pattern baldness,
they can obtain a patent on the use of the drug to treat male pattern
baldness—this is how we got Rogaine.73 Thus, patents can in some circumstances provide incentives for some types of deepening innovation.
However, while patent doctrine tries to support this type of deepening
innovation in theory, in practice it doesn’t do so particularly well, for two
reasons. First, patents for new uses are typically not especially valuable, and
therefore provide relatively weak incentives, because they are diﬃcult to
enforce.74 For new uses of existing drugs, once the patent covering the
drug itself has expired, generic manufacturers can make inexpensive generic
66. This limitation is significant. As Rebecca Eisenberg has pointed out, initial innovators’ incentives to develop new information drop as the patent approaches the end of its
life, especially for slow innovations like validating new uses for drugs. See Eisenberg, New
Uses, supra note 2, at 720.
67. See U.S. Patent No. 5,250,534 col. 1 l. 18 (filed May 14, 1992).
68. Mitradev Boolell, Michael J. Allen, Stephen A. Ballard, Sam Gepi-Attee, Gary J.
Muirhead, Alasdair M. Naylor, Ian H. Osterloh & Clive Gingell, Sildenafil: An Orally Active
Type 5 Cyclic GMP-Specific Phosphodiesterase Inhibitor for the Treatment of Penile Erectile
Dysfunction, 8 Int’l J. Impotence Res. 47 (1996).
69. Letter from Robert Temple, Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA, to
Sandra J. Croak-Brossman, Pfizer Cent. Research (Mar. 27, 1998), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/appletter/1998/20895ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/QTP4-FV28].
70. Letter from Norman Stockbridge, Acting Dir., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research,
FDA, to Martha C. Brumfield, Pfizer, Inc. ( June 3, 2005), https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/
drugsatfda_docs/appletter/2005/021845ltr.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4XY-PJJQ].
71. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text.
72. See Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 2, at 724–25.
73. Compare U.S. Patent No. 3,461,461 col. 1 l. 18 (filed Nov. 1, 1965) (claiming the compound minoxidil and its use to treat high blood pressure), with U.S. Patent No. 4,139,619
col. 1 l. 30 (filed Aug. 19, 1977) (claiming the use of minoxidil to stimulate hair growth).
74. See Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 2, at 724–25.
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versions of the drug. Patients can then use the cheaper, generic version for
any use, including the newly patented use (for example, by taking cheap
generic minoxidil, labeled only for use for hypertension, for baldness).75
Theoretically, the holder of the new use patent can sue doctors or patients
for violating its patent but realistically this is an unlikely strategy.76 Thus,
new use patents provide lower incentives than patents on entirely new
compounds.77
Second, as discussed below, the exclusive rights created by patents on
earlier inventions create costs for later innovators.78 Practicing a new use
of a patented product, even if the subject of an independent patent, can
still be blocked by an earlier patent on the product itself. This phenomenon reduces the net incentives to develop that new use through deepening
innovation.79
Taken as a whole, the doctrine of novelty creates substantial incentives
for innovation to follow either differentiating or exploring pathways, rather
than deepening pathways.
2. Nonobviousness. — Nonobviousness also pushes inventors away
from existing technologies. Under 35 U.S.C. § 103, an invention cannot
be patented if it would have been obvious to the person having ordinary
skill in the art,80 taking into account the universe of relevant prior art, the
diﬀerence between the prior art and the new invention, and the skill of
the “person having ordinary skill in the art,” or PHOSITA.81 The purpose
of the obviousness requirement is to ensure that patents are not available
for trivial advances in technology by requiring more substantial differences; it is a stronger screen than novelty but harder to administer.82 Under
an incentive theory of patenting, small diﬀerences from the prior art—
often, merely diﬀerentiating innovation—are too easy to need the incentive of an additional patent.83 The nonobviousness requirement thus aims
75. Id. at 720. There are complex strategies to try to avoid this pattern, but they do not
always work, and an exploration of them is outside the scope of this Essay. See, e.g., Robin
Feldman & Evan Frondorf, Drug Wars: A New Generation of Generic Pharmaceutical Delay,
53 Harv. J. on Legis. 499, 549–54 (2016) (discussing the strategy of “skinny label[ing],”
wherein brand companies attempt to restrict generic behavior by limiting the approved uses
listed on the drug’s label).
76. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 Mich. Telecomm.
& Tech. L. Rev. 345, 351 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Role of the FDA]; see also Amy
Kapczynski & Talha Syed, supra note 44, at 1917 (explaining how social norms make it problematic for patentees to sue doctors).
77. See Eisenberg, New Uses, supra note 2, at 724–25.
78. See infra section II.B.
79. See Scotchmer, supra note 22, at 32–33.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012).
81. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3, 17 (1966).
82. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417–18 (2007) (describing the
potential challenges a court may face in evaluating the obviousness of a new invention).
83. See Robert P. Merges, Uncertainty and the Standard of Patentability, 7 High Tech.
L.J. 1, 2 (1992) (arguing that uncertain innovation should more likely be held nonobvious).
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specifically at driving divergent innovation, and exploring innovation in
particular. It doesn’t always work.
Nonobviousness provides a weaker filter for exploring innovation in
the biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries than elsewhere.84 Predictability is the touchstone of obviousness, and these fields are considered
to be inherently unpredictable.85 If a medicinal chemist would be expected
to know that an existing drug could be improved by changing its structure
in a particular way, the nonobviousness doctrine should theoretically bar
receiving a patent on that improved drug.86 But as Rebecca Eisenberg
notes, nonobviousness analysis in pharmaceuticals suﬀers from something
of an opposite hindsight bias—rather than innovations looking more obvious
in hindsight, they look less obvious.87 The Federal Circuit (the appellate
court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent law) has accordingly made obviousness very hard to show.
To determine whether new chemicals—including pharmaceuticals—
are obvious, the Federal Circuit has adopted a doctrine known as “lead
compound analysis.”88 Essentially, if you want to show that a new chemical
is obvious, you do two things: First, you find a close relative that is already
known and second, you argue that the inventive step from that prior art
compound to the new compound would be an obvious step for a PHOSITA
to take.89 This is hard. Under the lead compound analysis framework, the
prior art must essentially contain each step rather plainly to demonstrate
prima facie obviousness.90 To show that a chemist of ordinary skill would
select that chemical as a “lead compound”—“a compound in the prior art
that would be most promising to modify”91—structural similarity is necessary but insuﬃcient; the field must know something about the putative
lead compound, such as activity, solubility, or toxicity, that makes it a
84. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575,
1593 (2003) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers] (“In biotechnology cases, the
Federal Circuit has gone to inordinate lengths to find biotechnological inventions
nonobvious, even if the prior art demonstrates a clear plan for producing the invention.”).
85. See KSR, 550 U.S. at 417–18 (emphasizing predictability); Sean B. Seymore, Heightened
Enablement in the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 127, 137–39 (2008) (“[E]ven though
the judiciary recognizes the unique challenges that inventions in the unpredictable arts
bring to the patent system, it has struggled to adapt the old doctrinal framework of the
patent laws to meet these challenges.”).
86. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs, supra note 2, at 532–34.
87. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 375,
378 (2008) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem].
88. See generally Briana Barron, Structural Uncertainty: Understanding the Federal
Circuit’s Lead Compound Analysis, 16 Marq. Intell. Prop. L. Rev. 401 (2012). The Federal
Circuit reaﬃrmed this relatively rigid test even after the Supreme Court counseled flexibility
in the obviousness analysis in KSR. Eisai Co. v. Dr. Reddy’s Labs., Ltd., 533 F.3d 1353, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2008).
89. Otsuka Pharm. Co. v. Sandoz, Inc., 678 F.3d 1280, 1291–92 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
90. Id. at 1291.
91. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
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promising lead.92 Once a lead compound (or a small set of lead compounds) is identified, you must show that “prior art would have supplied
one of ordinary skill in the art with a reason or motivation to modify a lead
compound to make the claimed compound with a reasonable expectation
of success.”93 This is a lot to ask of the prior art.94
Once a prima facie obviousness showing has been made, the patentee
can rebut it by showing unexpected properties compared to prior art compounds95—a factor that Chris Cotropia has noted adds an ex post windfall
element to nonobviousness rather than actually driving innovators to
pursue nonobvious paths.96 Overall, “lead compound analysis greatly
favors the patentee in most situations,”97 and “[i]n some biotechnology
cases, [the Federal Circuit’s approach] has functioned as a virtual per se
rule of nonobviousness for molecules that are not structurally similar to
molecules disclosed in the prior art.”98
In sum, although nonobviousness doctrine pushes innovators to
pursue exploring innovation rather than diﬀerentiating innovation, the
doctrine has little bite in biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. It still
pushes for divergent innovation over deepening innovation—the new
technology must still be diﬀerent from what has come before—but pushes
less strongly for exploring innovation. This weaker requirement allows
relatively small variations on known biopharmaceutical products to pass
the nonobviousness requirement.99
3. Utility. — Finally, an invention must be useful to be patentable.100
The utility doctrine does not directly promote divergent innovation, but it
does permit innovation to be new-for-the-sake-of-new, rather than better,
and that was not always a foregone conclusion. The first Patent Act, passed
in 1790, required that three cabinet members “deem the invention or
92. Otsuka, 678 F.3d at 1292.
93. Id.
94. See Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, supra note 87, at 377 (noting that
the Federal Circuit has “articulated an approach to evaluating the (non)obviousness of
chemical inventions, including pharmaceuticals, that sometimes seems as ‘rigid and
mandatory’ as the [teaching, suggestion, or motivation] approach at issue in KSR”).
95. Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, 550 F.3d 1075, 1089–90 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
96. Christopher A. Cotropia, Predictability and Nonobviousness in Patent Law After
KSR, 20 Mich. Telecomm. & Tech. L. Rev. 391, 394–95 (2014).
97. Barron, supra note 88, at 423; see also Douglas L. Rogers, Federal Circuit’s Obviousness
Test for New Pharmaceutical Compounds: Gobbledygook?, 14 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 49,
54 (2014) (“[T]he Federal Circuit . . . applies . . . a test for new pharmaceutical compounds
that generally makes it more diﬃcult than under KSR to prove obviousness.”).
98. Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, supra note 87, at 377.
99. See id.; Amir A. Naini, Convergent Technologies and Divergent Patent Validity
Doctrines: Obviousness and Disclosure Analyses in Software and Biotechnology, 86 J. Pat. &
Trademark Oﬀ. Soc’y 541, 544–60 (2004) (describing the eﬀects of “a relatively low nonobviousness barrier”); see also infra section III.B.1 (discussing me-too drugs).
100. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 112 (2012); Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364,
1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
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discovery suﬃciently useful and important,” requiring some meaningful
advance.101 But this language was eliminated in 1793.102 In the 1817 case
Lowell v. Lewis, the renowned patent litigator Daniel Webster argued that
inventions should only be patentable if they were not only new but also
better than existing technology.103 Justice Story, riding circuit, roundly
rejected this argument:
All that the law requires is, that the invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals
of society. But if the invention steers wide of these objections,
whether it be more or less useful is a circumstance very material
to the interests of the patentee, but of no importance to the public. If it be not extensively useful, it will silently sink into contempt
and disregard.104
Congress reintroduced an “importance” requirement in the 1836 Act.105
Michael Risch argues that the 1836 Act aimed to require some commercial
utility,106 but courts and the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) largely failed to implement that requirement and the utility requirement has become “toothless” over time.107 The Supreme Court did hold
in Brenner v. Manson that patentability requires “benefit derived by the
public from an invention with substantial utility,”108 which could theoretically justify some commercial relevance requirement.109 However, the
Federal Circuit weakened that holding in In re Brana, which held that
utility can be found even in very oblique assertions by the patent applicant,
that the patent examiner bears the burden of rebutting asserted utility, and
even that treating tumors in lab mice provides enough utility to satisfy the
requirement.110
The utility requirement does not require superiority to existing technology. Demonstrating superiority (or market demand, which is a weak
proxy) is hard at the time of patenting, which is typically early in the
101. Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat. 109–112 (1790) (repealed 1793).
102. Patent Act of 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318–323 (1793) (repealed 1836).
103. 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019 (C.C.D. Mass. 1817).
104. Id.
105. Patent Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117 (1836) (repealed 1870).
106. Michael Risch, Reinventing Usefulness, 2010 BYU L. Rev. 1195, 1236–40.
107. Id. at 1195. But see Sean B. Seymore, Making Patents Useful, 98 Minn. L. Rev. 1046,
1060–66 (2014) [hereinafter Seymore, Making Patents Useful] (arguing that the utility
requirement is minimal for certain types of inventions but stringent for others).
108. 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966).
109. See Risch, supra note 106, at 1232. Interestingly enough, nonobviousness doctrine
does sometimes take commercial relevance into account because commercial success is a
secondary indicator of nonobviousness—though as Robert Merges has noted, the link between commercial success and nonobviousness requires quite a few steps. Robert P. Merges,
Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on Innovation, 76 Calif.
L. Rev. 803, 838–52 (1988) [hereinafter Merges, Commercial Success] (presenting and critiquing this inferential leap).
110. 51 F.3d 1560, 1565–69 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
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development process; firms may not know themselves how well their
innovations perform.111 But that diﬃculty is not insurmountable. Jake
Sherkow, for instance, argues that post-application evidence should be
admissible to prove lack of enablement (and consequently, lack of utility)
for drugs that looked like they would work but actually did not.112
The Indian patent system goes even further. Section 3(d) of the
Indian Patents Act prohibits patenting derivatives of an existing substance—including new forms of drugs—unless they result “in the enhancement of the known eﬃcacy of that substance.”113 Section 3(d) deals with
the timing diﬃculty through its limited applicability—it is not relevant to
all innovations, just those that involve new forms of a known compound.114
These inventions are especially likely to be diﬀerentiating innovation
without new benefits.115 A patent on such an innovation requires a demonstration that the diﬀerentiation actually constitutes an improvement. The
Indian Supreme Court used this provision to deny a patent on Gleevec, a
blockbuster cancer drug sold by Novartis for which the patent covered only
a new form of a known chemical with no improved eﬃcacy.116 Amy
Kapczynski has argued that this provision should help innovation by driving companies to develop drugs that are better, not just new.117
Demonstrating superiority can be challenging even setting aside the
timing challenges. When a later innovation changes an earlier product so
that it works better for some but worse for others, is that an improvement?
If it works a bit worse, but at a much lower price?118 The now-defunct
Canadian promise doctrine held patentees to their own promises of utility,
sidestepping the problem by letting patentees define the goal.119 Indian
law leaves it largely undefined, at least for now. For biomedical innovation,
the issue may be somewhat easier due to the presence of regulators qualified
111. See Risch, supra note 106, at 1211–16 (noting the challenges of demonstrating
commercial utility at the time of patenting).
112. Sherkow, Reproducibility Paradox, supra note 29, at 907–11.
113. Patents Act, No. 39 of 1970, India Code, ch. 2 § 3(d), https://indiacode.nic.in/
bitstream/123456789/1392/3/a1970-39.pdf#search=PAtent%20acts [https://perma.cc/M4NV3D2U]. The section, overall focused on novelty, also prohibits patenting “the mere discovery
of any new property or new use for a known substance or of the mere use of a known process,
machine or apparatus unless such known process results in a new product or employs at
least one new reactant.” Id.
114. Id.
115. See infra section III.A.
116. Novartis AG v. Union of India, (2013) 13 SCR 148, 274–76 (India).
117. Amy Kapcysnski, Engineered in India—Patent Law 2.0, 369 New Eng. J. Med. 497,
498 (2013).
118. See generally Aaron L. Nelson, Joshua T. Cohen, Dan Greenberg & David M. Kent,
Much Cheaper, Almost as Good: Decrementally Cost-Eﬀective Medical Innovation, 151
Annals Internal Med. 662 (2009) [hereinafter Nelson et al., Almost as Good].
119. See Norman Siebrasse, The False Doctrine of False Promise, 29 Canadian Intell.
Prop. Rev. 3, 4–5 (2013) (describing the doctrine); id. at 47–55 (criticizing the doctrine);
see also AstraZeneca Canada Inc. v. Apotex Inc., [2017] 1 S.C.R. 943, para. 36 (Can.) (eliminating the doctrine).
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to evaluate at least some claims of superiority, particularly for close variants
of the same product.120 But in any event, U.S. utility doctrines do not require improvement.
B.

Infringement

Incentives from infringement mirror those from patentability. A
person infringes a patent when they make, use, sell, or import the patented
invention.121 The patentee may seek injunctive relief or damages for patent
infringement.122 Therefore, a later innovator working in a particular area
has an incentive to avoid infringing an earlier patent on an invention in
that area (assuming they are aware of the patent123). If Jenn is working in
the field of epinephrine auto-injectors, she has an incentive to avoid the
subject matter covered in patents on the EpiPen; if she cannot, she’ll have
to share some of her profits with the holders of those patents.124
A rich literature discusses patent policy in the context of cumulative
innovation.125 If the later innovation is worthwhile (that is, if Jenn’s ideas
for innovation based on the EpiPen are valuable), the innovation should
theoretically still take place because the patentee should be willing to
license the patent to the later innovator.126 But licensing is hard. Suzanne
Scotchmer and colleagues have theorized about how best to divide R&D
eﬀorts and social surplus between earlier and later inventors, concluding
that ex ante licenses are generally the best way to allocate surplus.127 Ex
post licenses are harder to reach and can result in hold-up problems.128
However, empirical evidence gathered by Heidi Williams and others suggests that ex ante licenses occur relatively rarely;129 James Bessen argues
120. See infra section IV.A.
121. 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
122. Id. §§ 283–284.
123. See Ouellette, Useful Information, supra note 36, at 557–59, 566–71 (discussing
why scientists might not read patents but finding evidence that at least some do).
124. See, e.g., Acorda Therapeutics, Inc. v. Roxane Labs., Inc., 903 F.3d 1310, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2018) (“[A] blocking patent diminishes possible rewards from a non-owner’s or nonlicensee’s investment activity aimed at an invention whose commercial exploitation would
be infringing, therefore reducing incentives for innovations in the blocked space by nonowners and non-licensees of the blocking patent.”).
125. See generally, e.g., Jerry R. Green & Suzanne Scotchmer, On the Division of Profit
in Sequential Innovation, 26 RAND J. Econ. 265 (1995) (discussing patents and cumulative
innovation); Scotchmer, supra note 22 (same).
126. See, e.g., James Bessen & Eric Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and
Imitation, 40 RAND J. Econ. 611, 613 (2009) (“[I]f the follow-on R&D is worthwhile, [the
patent holder] could share in its value by a suitably chosen licensing fee/royalty, thereby
increasing her own profit . . . .”). Edmund Kitch’s prospect theory of patents is a strong articulation of this idea. Kitch, supra note 38, at 276–80.
127. Green & Scotchmer, supra note 125, at 21.
128. See id.
129. Heidi L. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights and Innovation: Evidence from the
Human Genome, 121 J. Pol. Econ. 1, 23 (2013) [hereinafter Williams, Intellectual Property
Rights]; see also Bharat N. Anand & Tarun Khanna, The Structure of Licensing Contracts,
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that information asymmetries between the two parties can limit licensing.130 Williams identifies other limits, including Arrow’s information paradox (you can’t dicker over the price of an idea unless the idea is shared,
but once it’s been shared, why would the prospective buyer pay for it?).131
Whatever the exact causes, some empirical evidence suggests that IP on
earlier biomedical innovations limits later innovation in that area.132
Given a range of more and less divergent innovation possibilities, a
later innovator faces patent incentives to choose more divergent options
to avoid compensating the initial licensee through either licensing or
patent infringement.133 Negotiating a successful license is challenging,
whether ex ante or ex post, and in either case the later innovator must
share profits with the earlier patentee.134 Infringement liability is probabilistic but can be catastrophic.135 The innovator could also simply ignore
the patent, but that is a risky strategy, especially in biopharmaceutical
contexts where FDA approval and patents are tightly linked.136 In any case,
it may be easier—all else being equal—to avoid the problem altogether by
avoiding infringement of the patent.
Direct infringement liability can be found in either of two ways, each
of which has features promoting divergent innovation. First, literal infringement requires that the accused product be exactly covered by a patent; this
encourages inventing around, a form of divergent innovation in which
later innovators make changes to avoid infringement liability or the need
48 J. Indus. Econ. 103, 115 (2000) (finding low rates of ex ante licensing in many technological
areas, with the highest ex ante licensing rates (twenty-three percent) in chemicals and pharmaceuticals).
130. James Bessen, Holdup and Licensing of Cumulative Innovations with Private
Information, 82 Econ. Letters 321, 323 (2004).
131. Williams, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 129, at 23.
132. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 698–99 (1998) (making a theoretical argument about blocking gene patents); Fiona Murray, Philippe Aghion, Mathias
Dewatripoint, Julian Kolev & Scott Stern, Of Mice and Academics: Examining the Eﬀect of
Openness on Innovation, 8 Am. Econ. J. 212, 235–36 (2016) (finding that removing IP on
genetically engineered mice led to about a twenty to forty percent increase in citations to
scientific papers on those mice); see also Williams, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note
129, at 4 (“Celera’s IP appears to have generated economically and statistically significant
reductions in subsequent scientific research and product development, on the order of 20–
30 percent.”). But see Bhaven Sampat & Heidi L. Williams, How Do Patents Aﬀect FollowOn Innovation? Evidence from the Human Genome, 109 Am. Econ. Rev. 203, 229 (2019)
(finding that gene patenting did not decrease later innovation among genes of similar potential value).
133. Payment through patent infringement is probabilistic; it depends on a successful
suit (or willingness to pay in response to a demand letter). Nevertheless, the expected liability for infringing a patent is greater than zero. See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro,
Probabilistic Patents, J. Econ. Persp., Spring 2005, at 75, 88–89.
134. See Williams, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 129, at 22–24.
135. See generally Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 133, at 79–80 (discussing the economics of probabilistic patents).
136. See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 Mich. St. L. Rev. 19, 21–22, 29–31.

792

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:769

to license the patent.137 Literal infringement promotes diﬀerentiating
infringement. Second, the doctrine of equivalents creates liability beyond
the clear limits of a patent’s claim.138 It promotes exploratory innovation.
1. Literal Infringement and Inventing Around. — Literal infringement
requires that the accused product contain every element in the claimed
invention.139 To avoid infringement liability, innovators (those aware of an
existing patent) may engage in the process of “inventing around”: altering
an invention enough that it falls outside the boundaries of the patent
claims.140 For instance, if a claim described two pieces of a hinge with
recesses directly across from one another, a later entrant might make a
very similar product with the recesses oﬀset from one another, thus
attempting to avoid literal infringement.141 Inventing around has at times
been heralded as a spur to creativity on the part of later innovators;142 in
this case, perhaps oﬀset recesses prolong hinge life or are easier to manufacture. But perhaps not.
At base, inventing around requires that later innovators change an
invention, not because they may improve it, or because they may increase
the invention’s social welfare value or market share, but rather because
that change is necessary to avoid patent infringement. The second invention diﬀers purely for the sake of diﬀerence. Sometimes inventing around
may require trivial eﬀort, such as substituting a diﬀerent type of fastening;
other times, it may require substantial eﬀort, such as developing a slight

137. See, e.g., Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & James P. Evans, From Bilski Back to Benson: Preemption,
Inventing Around, and the Case of Genetic Diagnostics, 63 Stan. L. Rev. 1349, 1360–61
(2011) (describing the practice of inventing around in the context of genetic patents).
138. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950)
(describing the doctrine of equivalents as protecting against infringements of a product that
“performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same
result”).
139. Literal infringement is the mirror to anticipation, discussed supra section II.A.1. A
well-known maxim states, “That which infringes, if later, would anticipate, if earlier.” Peters
v. Active Mfg. Co., 129 U.S. 530, 537 (1889) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Peters v. Active Mfg. Co., 21 F. 319, 321 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1884)).
140. See Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 137, at 1360–61. To be sure, innovators may wish
to go further than just outside the boundaries of the patent claim, since the doctrine of
equivalents occasionally allows patentees to reach beyond those literal boundaries. See infra
section II.B.2.
141. Roton Barrier, Inc. v. Stanley Works, 79 F.3d 1112, 1126–27 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (aﬃrming a finding of no literal infringement and reversing a finding of infringement under the
doctrine of equivalents).
142. See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Free to Be You and Me? Copyright and Constraint, 128
Harv. L. Rev. Forum 125, 125–26 (2015) (noting the creativity-enhancing eﬀects of inventing
around); see also, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235–36 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (finding that the defendant’s conduct “involving keeping track of a competitor’s
products and designing new and possibly better or cheaper functional equivalents is the
stuﬀ of which competition is made and is supposed to benefit the consumer”).
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chemical variation on a drug and then taking that variant through hundreds of millions of dollars of clinical trials.143
Birth control pills provide an excellent example of pointless inventing
around. Bio-Technology Group makes Mircette, an oral contraceptive
protected by a patent that claims administering one week of an estrogenic
compound (during the user’s period) followed by three weeks of progestin.144 Duramed filed an application to market a generic version of the
drug—but to avoid infringing the patent, it changed the order of the drug
to three weeks of progestin followed by one week of an estrogenic
compound.145 Duramed hoped this unnecessary and unhelpful inventing
around would help it avoid infringing the relevant patent. (It didn’t work.146)
2. The Doctrine of Equivalents. — The doctrine of equivalents allows
courts to find infringement beyond the bounds of literal infringement.
Under the doctrine of equivalents, a product can infringe a patent, even
if it does not literally infringe, so long as it is not substantially diﬀerent
from the patented invention.147 The doctrine of equivalents pushes innovation from diﬀerentiating innovation toward exploring innovation; to the
extent that the doctrine brings slightly diﬀerent inventions to the fuzzy
ambit of a patent claim, later inventors face incentives to diverge further
from the existing product. Patents on especially groundbreaking inventions can theoretically be treated as “pioneer patents,” which receive even
broader protection, creating additional incentives for exploring innovation.148 Nevertheless, the doctrine of equivalents has become substantially
weaker over the years, including decreasing emphasis on pioneer patents,149 which has the impact of decreasing the incentives for exploring
innovation relative to merely diﬀerentiating innovation.150
143. See infra section III.B.
144. U.S. Patent No. Re. 35,724 col. 7 ll. 36–50.
145. Bio-Tech. Gen. Corp. v. Duramed Pharm., Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 229, 232–33 (D.N.J.
2001), rev’d, 325 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
146. See id. at 234–41 (finding no infringement). But see Bio-Tech. Gen., 325 F.3d at
1361, 1364 (reversing the district court).
147. See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 726–
27 (2002); Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 (1950).
148. See generally Esther Steinhauer, Note, Using the Doctrine of Equivalents to Provide
Broad Protection for Pioneer Patents: Limited Protection for Improvement Patents, 12 Pace
L. Rev. 491 (1992) (attempting to “reconcile[] the application of the doctrine of equivalents
with the protection of innovative and useful research”).
149. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The (Unnoticed) Demise of the Doctrine
of Equivalents, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 955, 958–60 & n.18 (2007) (“The [pioneer patent] doctrine
today may or may not be moribund, though it is clearly applied only infrequently by the
Federal Circuit.”).
150. Notably, the doctrine of reverse equivalents also promotes divergent innovation.
This doctrine—mostly moribund—holds that an accused product that literally infringes may
not infringe if it is in fact very diﬀerent from the subject matter of the original patent. Robert
Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking
Patents, 62 Tenn. L. Rev. 75, 75 (1994) (describing the reverse equivalents doctrine as “basically a rule of excused infringement; when it applies, it declares that even though a patentee
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****
Taken together, multiple doctrines of patentability and infringement
promote divergent innovation but do not require improvement. Novelty
and nonobviousness directly make it easier to obtain patents for diﬀerentiating or exploring innovation, and infringement liability, whether literal
or by equivalents, creates incentives to stray from existing, patented
technology. Coupled with these, the utility requirement allows diﬀerentiating innovation and exploring innovation without any accompanying
social welfare gain from improving the innovation. Thus, the costs of
divergence, described below, are less likely to be oﬀset by the benefits of
improved technology.
III. THE DARK SIDE OF DIVERGENT INNOVATION
Patent law drives divergent innovation, and divergence can create real
problems along with its benefits. This Part considers in detail three forms
of costs arising from divergent innovation: the costs of inventing around,
the lack of interoperability or standards, and the dispersion of knowledge
about particular technologies. It illustrates these problems through three
in-depth case studies and shorter examples. But novelty is not all bad; this
Part thus begins with a brief account of its benefits.
A.

Benefits of Divergent Innovation

To be sure, pushing innovators to constantly explore new paths of
innovation has benefits—I am not suggesting that innovation is bad, or
that creating incentives such that innovators broadly explore many possible paths is inherently problematic. The benefits of innovation are widely
recognized,151 and to the extent that our default conception of innovation
is to focus on new products or technologies, these benefits are largely
associated with divergent innovation. Most importantly, while patent doctrine does not require that inventions be better, only new,152 the inventions
certainly can be better, and these improvements drive progress.
Scholars have long argued that inventing around can be beneficial.
As Joseph Fishman summarizes, “The basic insight is that the patentee’s
has proven infringement, the infringer is free from liability”). But see Tate Access Floors,
Inc. v. Interface Architectural Res., Inc., 279 F.3d 1357, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (noting that
the reverse doctrine of equivalents had never been applied by the Federal Circuit). To the
extent that this takes truly divergent innovations out of the scope of literal infringement,
the doctrine of reverse equivalents promotes divergent innovation by exempting inventions
from the licensing fees or infringement liability resulting from earlier patents. But, as noted,
this doctrine is largely gone from practice.
151. See, e.g., Roin, Unpatentable Drugs, supra note 2, at 507–15 (“Pharmaceutical
innovation is often seen as the golden child of the patent system, with patents taking credit
for the discovery and development of valuable new drugs that provide tremendous health
benefits to the public.”).
152. See supra section II.A.3.
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right to exclude triggers a virtuous cycle in which one invention begets a
competing and sometimes even better invention.”153 We often don’t know
the best solution to a problem beforehand, and inventing around results
in diverse potential solutions.154 Scholars of innovation law and judges on
the Federal Circuit alike have argued that inventing around can generate
useful solutions and aid innovation.155
If consumers can identify better innovations, the market should reward improvements. Nonmonetary considerations can also drive improvement over mere diﬀerentiation—many innovators are driven not just by
profit motives but by the desire to improve the world.156 Finally, even if the
innovator is not trying to improve existing technology, but just to change
it, some fraction of changes will be improvements purely by chance. Such
improvements are a desirable result of divergent innovation and fit well
with the goals of the patent system.
Some benefits arise from divergent innovation even when the
innovation is not better—when it is just diﬀerent, or perhaps even when it
is somewhat worse. Mere diﬀerence can itself be beneficial. In a world of
varying needs, diﬀerent solutions can be helpful, even if none is strictly
better: Users may have diﬀerent tradeoﬀs between risks and benefits,
drugs may have diﬀerent side eﬀects, or users may have diﬀerent preferences along any number of dimensions.157 We may also learn new facts
from the mere existence of variation.158
Divergent innovation that yields no technical improvement can also
lower costs. Most straightforwardly, competition between substitutes should
lower costs to consumers.159 The only producer in a class can charge
153. Joseph P. Fishman, Creating Around Copyright, 128 Harv. L. Rev. 1333, 1339 (2015).
154. Id. at 1353.
155. See, e.g., id. at 1353–55; see also, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751
F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called
‘negative incentive’ to ‘design around’ a competitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace.”).
156. See generally, e.g., Maurice Cassier & Christiane Sinding, ‘Patenting in the Public
Interest:’ Administration of Insulin Patents by the University of Toronto, 24 Hist. & Tech.
153 (2008) (describing the patenting of insulin and licensing to the University of Toronto
for management in the public interest); Margit Osterloh & Sandra Rota, Open Source
Software Development—Just Another Case of Collective Invention?, 36 Res. Pol’y 157
(2007) (describing the open software movement and intrinsic motivation for invention).
157. This variation may, of course, be captured in broader definitions of “better” products. See supra section II.A.3.
158. But see infra section III.D (describing the costs associated with broader, shallower
knowledge from divergent innovation).
159. See Fiona Scott Morton & Lysle T. Boller, Enabling Competition in Pharmaceutical
Markets 1 (Hutchins Ctr., Working Paper No. 30, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2017/05/wp30_scottmorton_competitioninpharma1.pdf [https://perma.cc/
455P-T932] (discussing the benefits of competition between substitutes). In the drug industry in particular, competition between substitutes is complicated because it is mediated by
FDA; substitutes may be similar drugs that are also branded or generic drugs that are
determined to be bioequivalent by FDA. See id. at 8–10.
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monopoly prices, but once multiple substitutes exist in a product class—
diﬀerent, even if not better—prices should drop closer to the cost of
production. Competition between substitutes doesn’t always work especially well in biomedical innovation, where patient and doctor preferences
for particular products can be sticky and can reduce competition, but it
still has some eﬀect even there and is tremendously important in markets
in general.160 Costs can also be lowered through a diﬀerent type of divergent innovation, in which the new technology actually performs worse but
does so at a lower cost, which may be a preferable combination to some
purchasers.161
The benefits from divergent innovation are substantial, whether the
innovation is an improvement or not. Nevertheless, balanced against those
benefits are costs that are less often recognized.
B.

Costs of Inventing Around

Inventing around an existing patented invention is costly. When downstream inventors are forced to vary an invention simply for the purpose of
avoiding an existing patent, they spend R&D resources on something that
may turn out to have little or no benefit.162 Even if the result is beneficial,
other innovation might have been a better allocation of those resources.163
In a prominent early study of the R&D costs of imitating competitors,
Richard Levin and colleagues found substantial costs of inventing around.164
Many industry leaders stated that duplicating competitors’ patented major
new processes or products would cost nearly as much as the competitor
spent to develop it in the first place.165 Without patents, the estimated costs
dropped significantly, suggesting that inventing around patents is a costly

160. See generally, e.g., Panos Kanavos, Joan Costa Font & Alistair McGuire, Product
Diﬀerentiation, Competition, and Regulation of New Drugs: The Case of Statins in Four
European Countries, 28 Managerial & Decision Econ. 455 (2007) (discussing competition
among statins in Europe).
161. See Nelson et al., Almost as Good, supra note 118, at 662.
162. See, e.g., Michael Abramowicz, Perfecting Patent Prizes, 56 Vand. L. Rev. 115, 190–
91 (2003); Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
1813, 1869–70 (1984).
163. See, e.g., Subcomm. on Patents, Trademarks & Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 85th Cong., An Economic Review of the Patent System 50–52 (Comm. Print 1958)
(authored by Fritz Machlup) (lamenting how inventing around wastes “inventive talent”).
164. Richard C. Levin, Alvin K. Klevorick, Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter,
Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, 3 Brookings Papers
on Econ. Activity 783, 802–11 (1987), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/
1987/12/1987c_bpea_levin_klevorick_nelson_winter_gilbert_griliches.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PKU7-BWNR].
165. Id. at 809 (reporting that, in 66 of 127 industries, respondents estimated the costs
of duplicating a major patented new process to be 76 to 100% of the innovator’s R&D costs;
in 63 of 127 industries, respondents estimated the same for products).
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endeavor;166 similarly, duplication costs for patented inventions increased
more in industries with stronger patent protection in general.167 Overall,
Levin and colleagues found that patents raise imitation costs by forty percent for new drugs, thirty percent for major new chemical products, and
twenty-five percent for typical new chemical products168—presumably all
diﬀerentiating inventions to copy the product with enough diﬀerences to
avoid the patents. For electronics, patents increased imitation costs by
seven to fifteen percent for major products and seven to ten percent for
typical products.169 These numbers are old—the survey was conducted in
1987—but the general pattern accords with the idea that patents substantially increase the costs of developing existing technologies by requiring
inventing around.
The drug industry provides many examples of divergent innovation
with high costs of inventing around. Two areas stand out: “me-too” drugs
and evergreening practices.
1. Me-Too Drugs. — Me-too drugs, also known as “follow-on” drugs,
have similar chemical structures and mechanisms of action as alreadymarketed drugs.170 They evoke both sides of divergent innovation: Critics
argue that they require redundant R&D with little benefit,171 while supporters argue they can better serve diﬀerent subpopulations and can reduce
prices through competition.172
Statins show how patents drive me-too drug development and how development’s costs can outweigh its benefits.173 Researchers began synthesizing

166. Id. (reporting that, in 49 of 127 industries, respondents estimated the costs of duplicating a major unpatented new process to be 76 to 100% of innovator R&D; in 40 of 127
industries, respondents estimated the same for products).
167. Id. at 810. Although the costs of duplication increased with a patent, the time to
duplication decreased in some industries, suggesting that the disclosure found in patents at
least helps focus duplicative R&D eﬀorts. Id. at 810–11.
168. Id. at 811.
169. Id.
170. Joseph A. DiMasi & Laura B. Faden, Competitiveness in Follow-On Drug R&D: A
Race or Imitation?, 10 Nature Revs. Drug Discovery 23, 23 (2011).
171. Id.; see also Nicole M. Gastala, Peter Wingrove, Anne Gaglioti, Stephen Petterson
& Andrew Bazemore, Medicare Part D: Patients Bear the Cost of ‘Me Too’ Brand-Name
Drugs, 35 Health Aﬀ. 1237, 1237 (2016).
172. See DiMasi & Faden, supra note 170, at 23. The price-competition point is especially complex for drugs; while competition between diﬀerent on-patent branded drugs can
reduce prices, the entry of generic versions of a branded drug results in far lower prices. See
Generic Competition and Drug Prices, FDA, https://www.fda.gov/about-fda/center-drugevaluation-and-research-cder/generic-competition-and-drug-prices [https://perma.cc/66B9BLHU] (last updated Dec. 19, 2019). To the extent that me-too drugs result in higher use
of branded drugs relative to generic drugs, the overall market price for the group of drugs
is thus likely to remain higher.
173. See Gastala et al., supra note 171, at 1237 exhibit 1 (using statins to illustrate how
“me-too” drugs raise costs for consumers); see also Joshua J. Gagne & Niteesh K. Choudhry,
How Many “Me-Too” Drugs Is Too Many?, 305 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 711, 711 (2011) (illustrating
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statins in the late 1970s to lower cholesterol and reduce the risk of coronary heart disease.174 Merck received FDA approval for the first, Mevacor
(lovastatin), in 1987.175 Since Mevacor’s release, researchers have discovered eight more statins; FDA has approved six of them.176 Pfizer’s Lipitor
(atorvastatin) was approved in 1997 and became one of the best-selling
drugs of all time, with over $100 billion in revenue by 2011.177 AstraZeneca’s
Crestor (rosuvastatin), approved in 2003, had over $62 billion in sales by
2017.178
The development of Crestor shows the power of patent law’s incentives for divergent innovation. After Pfizer brought Lipitor to market in
1987, researchers in Japan sought to develop a new statin.179 The researchers initially experimented with variations on the same chemical core
contained in atorvastatin.180 Results from those early experiments, however, proved toxic in animals, stymieing the researchers’ progress.181 So
they switched gears, moving to a diﬀerent chemical core.182 Working with
this new core, the researchers discovered rosuvastatin, a new statin that
appeared to have promising levels of potency with limited side eﬀects in
animal studies.183 In 1993, the researchers received a patent for their discovery,184 which was eventually sold as the blockbuster drug Crestor.185
In the process, patent law pushed the research in a direction that
researchers expected would be only moderately successful—but which,
how “me-too” drugs like statins “may make treatment decisions more diﬃcult and may
undermine clinical outcomes”).
174. See Akira Endo, A Historical Perspective on the Discovery of Statins, 86 Proc. Japan
Acad. Series B Physical & Biological Sci. 484, 487, 489 (2010).
175. See id. at 490; Jeremy A. Greene, The Abnormal and the Pathological: Cholesterol,
Statins, and the Threshold of Disease, in Medicating Modern America: Prescription Drugs
in History 183, 183–84 (Andrea Tone & Elizabeth Siegel Watkins eds., 2007).
176. See Emma Hennessy, Claire Adams, F. Jerry Reen & Fergal O’Gara, Is There Potential
for Repurposing Statins as Novel Antimicrobials?, 60 Antimicrobial Agents & Chemotherapy
5111, 5111 (2016).
177. See Veronique Dupont, Pfizer’s Blockbuster Drug Lipitor Goes Generic, Med. Xpress
(Nov. 30, 2011), https://medicalxpress.com/news/2011-11-pfizer-blockbuster-drug-lipitor.html
[https://perma.cc/39V2-CHXU].
178. Tracy Staton, 1. Crestor, FiercePharma (Aug. 28, 2017), https://www.fiercepharma.com/
special-report/1-crestor [https://perma.cc/4J4N-Y7VW]; see also In re Rosuvastatin Calcium
Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 515 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
179. See In re Rosuvastatin, 703 F.3d at 515.
180. See Plaintiﬀs’ Responsive Post-Trial Brief at 5–6, In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent
Litig., 719 F. Supp. 2d 388 (D. Del. 2010), 1:07-cv-00811-JJF, 2010 WL 9432313.
181. See id. at 6–7.
182. Id. at 7.
183. Id. at 7–8.
184. U.S. Patent No. 5,260,440.
185. In re Rosuvastatin Calcium Patent Litig., 703 F.3d 511, 514–15 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
Arguably, the development process includes elements of all three types of innovation;
researchers started out trying to diﬀerentiate and ended up moving more toward exploring
innovation once they found toxicity—perhaps best characterized as a form of deepening
innovation.
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coincidentally, would be easier to patent. Counsel for AstraZeneca described the invention during a 2010 patent dispute.186 Counsel noted that
a PHOSITA, “if provided with the structure of rosuvastatin on [the date of
invention], at best might expect that rosuvastatin would function as a statin
and therefore could inhibit cholesterol in humans.”187 Thus, researchers
would think rosuvastatin was—at best!—nothing more than a me-too
statin.188 And in fact, this “at best” result was probably not reality. At the
time, researchers “would have . . . expected” that a structure like rosuvastatin would have “poor activity, and thus be considered a failure” based on
the prevailing research.189 As the Federal Circuit noted, “[A]t least five
pharmaceutical companies had abandoned their research on statins with
[similar chemical] cores, on the prevailing belief that [such] statins were
not promising leads to improved products.”190
While this likelihood of failure makes research less promising to
pursue, it makes getting a patent easier. One of the secondary indicia of
nonobviousness is “teaching away”; if the prevailing knowledge in a field
suggests that a new solution will not be successful and “teaches away” from
that solution, that solution becomes more likely to be nonobvious and
therefore patentable.191 Similarly, surprising and unexpected results make
inventions more likely to be patented and bolstered the validity of the
patent covering Crestor.192
To reiterate: I am not arguing that patent law’s penchant for divergence is all bad, in this example or elsewhere. Pursuing modifications to
the same chemical scaﬀold can have benefits, lowering the risk of oﬀ-target
eﬀects and leading cheaper development.193 Small tweaks to a molecule
could also make it much better, and it is often diﬃcult to know in advance
whether they will. In the case of Crestor, patent law created incentives for
186. In re Rosuvastatin, 719 F. Supp. 2d at 388.
187. Plaintiﬀs’ Responsive Post-Trial Brief at 72, In re Rosuvastatin, 719 F. Supp. 2d 388,
1:07-cv-00811-JJF, 2010 WL 9432313.
188. In fact, AstraZeneca did not even license the drug rights (a proxy for measuring its
commercial potential) from the original patent assignee until 1998, five years after the first
U.S. rosuvastatin patent issued. Benjamin Yang, Drug Profile: Crestor, Discovery Med. (May
23, 2009), http://www.discoverymedicine.com/Benjamin-Yang/2009/05/23/drug-profilecrestor/ [https://perma.cc/V4TD-9MND].
189. See Plaintiﬀs’ Responsive Post-Trial Brief at 56, In re Rosuvastatin, 719 F. Supp. 2d
388, 1:07-cv-00811-JJF, 2010 WL 9432313.
190. In re Rosuvastatin, 703 F.3d at 517.
191. See In re Gurley, 27 F.3d 551, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“A reference may be said to
teach away when a person of ordinary skill, upon reading the reference, would be discouraged from following the path set out in the reference, or would be led in a direction
divergent from the path that was taken by the applicant.”).
192. See In re Rosuvastatin, 703 F.3d at 516–18 (explaining how unexpectedness supported the plaintiﬀ’s patent).
193. See Camille G. Wermuth, Similarity in Drugs: Reflections on Analogue Design, 11
Drug Discovery Today 348, 348–49 (2006) (“The process of using marketed drug structures
as a basis for investigation . . . results in increased eﬃcacy and safety of therapeutic agents,
thanks to iterative improvements.”).
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Japanese researchers to pursue a new line of research (even though, and
in fact because, it seemed unlikely to work). That type of counterintuitive
knowledge creation—that the new line did actually work—is innovation
that we wouldn’t get without patents.
But statins and other divergent me-too drugs come with substantial
costs, and it is not at all clear that those costs are worth the benefits. One
meta-analysis comparing four leading statins found that “it is barely possible to diﬀerentiate between the diﬀerent statins in relation to any outcome.”194 The authors found that statins were equally eﬀective across
subpopulations including women, patients with diabetes, and older patients,
and are all generally well tolerated.195 There is little diﬀerence between
the drugs, but drug companies have developed eight statins and gotten
them approved, and each one costs substantial resources in terms of making
the drug, running clinical trials, and undergoing FDA evaluation.196
Me-too drugs are also costly in terms of, well, cost. More drugs in a
class may decrease the average cost of branded drugs by some amount—a
common argument for me-too drugs and diﬀerentiating innovation in
general.197 However, branded me-too drugs are typically much more
expensive than generic versions of the earlier drugs and sometimes are
developed even after the pioneer drug has already lost patent protection
and generics have entered the market (multiple statins follow this pattern).198 Nevertheless, many doctors and patients stick with the more
expensive me-too drugs rather than shifting to the far cheaper generics,
raising social costs and firm profits alike.199 Why? It’s typically not because
194. S. Ward, M. Lloyd Jones, A. Pandor, M. Holmes, R. Ara, A. Ryan, W. Yeo & N. Payne,
A Systematic Review and Economic Evaluation of Statins for the Prevention of Coronary
Events, Health Tech. Assessment, Apr. 2007, at 1, 63; see also Murray Aitken, Ernst R. Berndt
& David M. Cutler, Prescription Drug Spending Trends in the United States: Looking
Beyond the Turning Point, 28 Health Aﬀ. w151, w157 (2009) (“Although some controversy
still exists, general consensus among the medical community is that for most patients, the
various statins are equally eﬀective and safe, and thus are therapeutically substitutable. An
exception is at very high dosages, where Lipitor is believed to be more eﬀective.”). But see
Peter H. Jones, Michael H. Davidson, Evan A. Stein, Harold E. Bays, James M. McKenney,
Elinor Miller, Valerie A. Cain & James W. Blasetto, Comparison of the Eﬃcacy and Safety of
Rosuvastatin Versus Atorvastatin, Simvastatin, and Pravastatin Across Doses (STELLAR TRIAL),
92 Am. J. Cardiology 152, 157–59 (2003) (finding some diﬀerences among statins).
195. See Ward et al., supra note 194, at 48–52, 62–63; see also Cesar S. Recto II, Stella
Acosta & Adrian Dobs, Comparison of the Eﬃcacy and Tolerability of Simvastatin and
Atorvastatin in the Treatment of Hypercholesterolemia, 23 Clinical Cardiology 682, 688
(2000) (finding that simvastatin and atorvastatin are similarly tolerable).
196. See Gagne & Choudry, supra note 173, at 711–12.
197. See Stephane Régnier, What Is the Value of ‘Me-Too’ Drugs?, 16 Health Care Mgmt.
Sci. 300, 301 (2013).
198. See Gagne & Choudry, supra note 173, at 711. This is not always the case; many
instances that look like me-too imitations are really drug companies racing to pursue the
same target. See Joseph A. DiMasi & Cherie Paquette, The Economics of Follow-On Drug
Research and Development, PharmacoEconomics Supplement 2, Oct. 2004, at 1, 9–10.
199. Régnier, supra note 197, at 301 (describing how me-too drugs can lead to slower
adoption of generics after the pioneer loses patent protection). See generally Anupam B.
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the me-too drugs are better.200 Instead, the market share from me-too
drugs comes largely from marketing eﬀorts201—eﬀorts that are unsurprisingly focused on me-too drugs.202
2. Evergreening Practices. — “Evergreening,” a special subset of metoo drug development practices, shows especially clearly the extent of newfor-the-sake-of-new diﬀerentiating innovation. In evergreening practices
(also called “lifecycle management”), pharmaceutical companies engage
in various practices to extend the eﬀective term of patent protection on
their drugs.203 Evergreening typically involves the initial innovator taking
later actions to extend the eﬀective patent life by making small changes to
a drug.204 The initial patent on a drug inevitably expires, on average about
twelve years after a drug is approved.205 Patent term limits drive divergent
innovation: If the drug maker wants to maintain a monopoly, it needs to
win new patents.
Firms use diﬀerentiating innovations to extend the eﬀective patent
term on a drug by making minor changes to the drug’s formulation, method of delivery, or, in the most extreme cases, active ingredient (changing
the drug but keeping market share).206 There are many, many examples.207
In a particularly prominent case, AstraZeneca was about to lose patent
protection on Prilosec (omeprazole), a racemic mixture of both left- and
right-handed molecules used to treat acid reflux and related conditions.208
AstraZeneca isolated one enantiomer (a left- or right-handed molecule)

Jena, John E. Calfee, Edward C. Mansley & Tomas J. Philipson, ‘Me-Too’ Innovation in
Pharmaceutical Markets, 12 F. for Health Econ. & Pol’y, Jan. 2009, at 1 (noting the lack of
substitution from follow-on branded drugs to generics of the pioneer drug and using this to
argue that there must be some superiority visible to doctors and patients).
200. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
201. Régnier, supra note 197, at 312 (finding that me-too drugs spend twenty percent
more on marketing than pioneer drugs and that market share is related to marketing but
not to price).
202. See Charles Ornstein & Ryann Grochowski Jones, Vying for Market Share, Companies
Heavily Promote ‘Me Too’ Drugs, ProPublica ( Jan. 7, 2015), https://www.propublica.org/
article/vying-for-market-share-companies-heavily-promote-me-too-drugs [https://perma.cc/
UBK9-4PY6].
203. See C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and
Eﬀective Market Life in Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. Health Econ. 327, 327–28 (2012).
204. Id. at 330 & n.10 (describing action taken by drug manufacturers to extend the
patent lifecycle).
205. Id. at 337. For an exploration of how the ticking patent clock shapes pharmaceutical target selection, see Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Firms
Underinvest in Long-Term Research? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials, 105 Am. Econ.
Rev. 2044, 2044–49 (2015) (finding greater investment in drugs with shorter clinical trials).
206. See Hemphill & Sampat, supra note 203, at 328–29.
207. See id. at 330 (reporting that, on average, each of the 119 drugs studied has two
patents covering ancillary components).
208. See Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product Hopping: A New Framework,
92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 167, 172, 224–25 (2016).
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from the mixture, patented it, and got it approved as Nexium (esomeprazole).209 This move has been tremendously profitable, and Nexium is a
blockbuster drug, but it seems to have minimal therapeutic benefit over
Prilosec, even though it cost a lot to develop in terms of FDA approval and
clinical trials, and costs a lot to buy today.210 Other strategies include changing the dosage form from twice-a-day to once-a-day (Actavis’ Namenda IR
(memantine) to Namenda XR)211 or replacing a drug with the metabolite
the body makes from the drug (Pfizer’s Efexor-XR (venlafaxine) to Pristiq
(desvenlafaxine)).212
These evergreening changes have little evidence that they help patients more than the original drugs—but they result in new patents and
extended market protection.213 As Hazel Moir puts it:
Was the invention of desvenlafaxine induced by the patent
system? Almost certainly—without a further effective market
exclusivity period, it seems unlikely that Pfizer would have developed this alternative medicine. Was there any benefit to society
from the development of this ‘new’ medicine? . . . [A] net benefit
in exchange for this monopoly grant is hard to perceive.214
These changes are all examples of innovation that make a new product
just diﬀerent enough from the old product to get patent protection. The
only real diﬀerence to patients is that they pay higher prices longer.
****
The exact empirics of the balance between the costs and benefits of
inventing around are uncertain and perhaps unascertainable. But at the
least, we should recognize the costs—indeed, some already have215—and
tally those against the baseline assumption that novelty is inherently a good
goal for the patent system.
209. Id. at 172.
210. See id. at 224–25; Aaron S. Kesselheim, Michael A. Fischer & Jerry Avorn, Extensions
of Intellectual Property Rights and Delayed Adoption of Generic Drugs: Eﬀects on Medicaid
Spending, 25 Health Aﬀ. 1637, 1642–43 (2006).
211. See New York ex rel. Schneiderman v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 646–48 (2d Cir.
2015); Carrier & Shadowen, supra note 208, at 198–200 (discussing the case as an example
of the “product hopping” evergreen strategy).
212. See Hazel V. J. Moir, Exploring Evergreening: Insights from Two Medicines, 49
Australian Econ. Rev. 413, 419–21 (2016). This particular technique no longer works; the
doctrine of inherent anticipation now prevents patenting a known drug’s metabolite. See
Schering Corp. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 339 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2003). For an examination of the doctrine, see generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Inherency, 47 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 371 (2005).
213. See David F. Lehmann & Sarabeth Wojnowicz, The Evergreening of Biopharmaceuticals:
Time to Defoliate, 56 J. Clinical Pharmacology 383, 387 (2015) (arguing that evergreening
techniques are common but offer little benefit). But see Israel Agranat & Silvya R. Wainschtein,
The Strategy of Enantiomer Patents of Drugs, 15 Drug Discovery Today 163, 167–69 (2010)
(arguing that the obviousness doctrine will render many such patents invalid).
214. Moir, supra note 212, at 420.
215. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 162, at 190–91; Dan L. Burk, Perverse Innovation
1, 26–29 (2016); Dreyfuss & Evans, supra note 137, at 1371–72.
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Finally, the costs of inventing around are not incurred only by the
innovator, but also by other social institutions.216 When new drugs are developed just to avoid an existing patent, the second innovator must conduct
clinical trials. In addition to the economic costs felt by the innovator, the
subjects in those trials face risks of injury or foregoing better treatment
options.217 FDA will expend resources evaluating the new drug, and those
costs will be higher because the new drug needs to be evaluated from
scratch rather than as a new set of information about an existing product.218 And, as described below, generating and sharing information about
a slightly diﬀerent product spreads out the process of learning and the
development of expertise.219 In sum, the process of inventing around to
create something new—just to avoid an existing patent—creates its own
costs; those costs may be oﬀset by some benefits, but they may also be
wasted eﬀort.
C.

Barriers to Interoperability

Divergent innovation can reduce the ability of products to interact
with each other. When products interact readily, sharing standards, many
things are easier: Consumers can switch from one vendor to another,
replacement parts can be produced in a competitive market, and network
eﬀects can develop when many people use the same system.220 Systems that
don’t work well together can raise the costs of switching from one system
to another and thus promote lock-in.221 For biomedical technology, interoperability can lead to modularized system parts that can be improved
separately.222 The ability to pass information between diﬀerent systems is
also key to many health technologies and requires interoperability.223
216. To the extent that these social costs are internalized by innovators or consumers,
of course, this all comes out in the wash. But it is still useful to group together the initial
source of the costs.
217. See generally, e.g., Kenneth J. Rothman & Karin B. Michels, The Continuing
Unethical Use of Placebo Controls, 331 New Eng. J. Med. 394 (1994) (describing ethical
concerns with placebo trials). Certainly, there is also a chance that the participants may
encounter a better treatment.
218. Cf. Francis S. Collins, Mining for Therapeutic Gold, 10 Nature Revs. Drug Discovery
397, 397 (2011) (noting that existing information about a drug can speed up clinical testing).
219. See infra section III.D.
220. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,
90 Calif. L. Rev. 1889, 1896–97 (2002) [hereinafter Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights]
(arguing that the ability of products to interact produces many positive benefits, both in the
marketplace and for consumers).
221. See, e.g., William Barnes, Myles Gartland & Martin Stack, Old Habits Die Hard:
Path Dependency and Behavioral Lock-In, 38 J. Econ. Issues 371, 371–73 (2004) (explaining
the concept of lock-in).
222. Hassan Masum, Rebecca Lackman & Karen Bartleson, Developing Global Health
Technology Standards: What Can Other Industries Teach Us?, Globalization & Health, Oct.
2013, at 1, 2 (discussing how interoperability can lead to modularized system parts).
223. See, e.g., W. Nicholson Price II, Risk and Resilience in Health Data Infrastructure,
16 Colo. Tech. L.J. 65, 66–67 (2017).
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A rich literature addresses standards, interoperability, and intellectual
property. One prominent strand discusses the problem of overlapping
patent rights and the role that standard-setting organizations can play in
reducing that problem.224 Another strand considers what happens when
patents cover technologies essential to adhere to an industry standard.225
This section considers a problem in some sense antecedent to both: When
patents create incentives for innovators to pursue divergent innovation,
they can drive a proliferation of diﬀerent technologies that may be
incompatible.226 That is to say, patent-promoted divergent innovation can
lead to the problem that standards try to solve.227
Wearable insulin pumps show how patent-related divergent innovation can lead to interoperability problems. Insulin pumps help individuals
with diabetes deliver insulin more easily than traditional manual injections.228 First developed in 1963,229 they are now typically small devices
(about the size of a deck of cards) that deliver insulin through a thin tube
to a cannula implanted in a patient.230
Before 2001, the industry used a standard system to connect durable
insulin pumps (which last for years) with disposable insulin sets (which last
for a few days, contain insulin, and connect to the pumps) via “luer locks.”231
Medtronic, the dominant maker of insulin pumps at the time, made several types of pumps under the name MiniMed that used standard luer
locks.232 Kits connecting to these pumps could be and were made by
224. See Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 220, at 1948–54 (discussing
how standard-setting organizations can reduce the problem of overlapping patent rights).
225. See generally, e.g., Janice M. Mueller, Patent Misuse Through the Capture of Industry
Standards, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 623 (2002) (describing how conflicts arise when patent holders are involved in setting industry standards); Pamela Samuelson, Are Patents on Interfaces
Impeding Interoperability?, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1943, 2004–05 (2009) (arguing that market
forces typically overcome problems of interface patents and result in interoperability).
226. The problems are not totally distinct; when a standard is covered by patents, innovators face an incentive not to use the standard to avoid licensing those patents. That incentive may be overcome if the benefits of standardization are suﬃcient, but it nevertheless
pushes toward divergence.
227. Bernard Chao has written about the challenge that arises when patents on interfaces that are no better than existing technology—what he calls “horizontal innovation”—
are used to limit interoperability, with a focus on information technology. See Bernard
Chao, Horizontal Innovation and Interface Patents, 2016 Wis. L. Rev. 287, 295–307.
228. Grazia Aleppo, Insulin Pump Overview: How Insulin Pumps Work, Who Benefits
from Them, and Different Types of Pumps, EndocrineWeb (Mar. 5, 2019), https://
www.endocrineweb.com/guides/insulin/insulin-pump-overview [https://perma.cc/X94DK95F].
229. Noel E. Schaeﬀer, Linda J. Parks, Erik T. Verhoef, Timothy S. Bailey, Alan B. Schorr,
Trent Davis, Jean Halford & Becky Sulik, Usability and Training Diﬀerences Between Two
Personal Insulin Pumps, 9 J. Diabetes Sci. & Tech. 221, 221 (2015).
230. Aleppo, supra note 228.
231. Medtronic Minimed Inc. v. Smiths Med. MD Inc., 371 F. Supp. 2d 578, 581 (D. Del.
2005).
232. Id. at 581–82.

2020]

COST OF NOVELTY

805

multiple vendors, including Medtronic.233 In 1999, a new market entrant
began aggressively marketing its own luer lock–compatible insulin kits.234
Two years later, Medtronic introduced the Paradigm line of insulin pumps,
which use a proprietary connection system that Medtronic patented.235
Unsurprisingly, the number of manufacturers making insulin sets compatible with Medtronic pumps dropped substantially.236 Since 2001, Medtronic
has developed multiple diﬀerent insertion and connection systems with
proprietary connections.237 For some systems, it remains the only manufacturer, and other diabetes manufacturers have developed their own, incompatible, proprietary systems.238 This divergence did not respond to some
flaw with prior systems—even though divergent and incompatible standards have spread, many insulin pumps still use mutually compatible luerlock systems today,239 even as insulin sets themselves have developed new
features.240
Patents created an incentive to develop a system diﬀerent from the
prior art just for the sake of obtaining a patent. Medtronic was encouraged
to engage in diﬀerentiating innovation. But the story didn’t stop there;
once Medtronic moved away from the existing industry luer-lock standard,
other innovators then pursued their own proprietary interface standards,
diverging not only to pursue patent benefits but also presumably to avoid
paying Medtronic for technologies that might infringe its new patents. The
result was a proliferation of diﬀerent incompatible systems. This incompatibility comes with economic and personal costs; aside from potential
damage to competition,241 switching between insulin pumps with diﬀerent

233. Id.
234. Id. at 582.
235. See U.S. Patent No. 6,585,695 B1; see also Medtronic, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 581.
236. See Medtronic, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 582 (describing design changes that made nonMedtronic insulin sets incompatible with Medtronic insulin pumps).
237. Infusion Sets, Medtronic, http://www.medtronicdiabetes.com/products/infusionsets [https://perma.cc/S3MH-AY2V] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
238. See, e.g., Dep’t of Veterans Aﬀairs, Justification for Single Source Awards IAW FAR
13.106-1 (May 6, 2016), https://www.vendorportal.ecms.va.gov/FBODocumentServer/
DocumentServer.aspx?DocumentId=2996620&FileName=VA770-16-Q-0506-003.pdf (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) ( justifying purchasing only MiniMed infusion sets for users
of MiniMed insulin pumps and only Animas infusion sets for users of Animas insulin
pumps).
239. Infusion Set Comparison, Diabetesnet.com (Dec. 2, 2010), https://www.diabetesnet.com/
diabetes-technology/infusion-sets [https://perma.cc/K9UP-RSMA].
240. See, e.g., Up Close with BD’s New Infusion Set: A Much Needed Improvement to
Insulin Pumps, diaTribe Learn (May 18, 2015), https://diatribe.org/close-bd-new-infusionset-much-needed-innovation-improve-insulin-pumps [https://perma.cc/W6LV-SNX3].
241. Competitive harms suggest that such patent-prompted interoperability can sometimes raise antitrust concerns. Indeed, Smiths made exactly such an argument but failed.
Medtronic, 371 F. Supp. 2d at 584–85. This argument was made with greater success in C.R.
Bard, Inc. v. M3 Sys., Inc., in which a company changed the design of a biopsy gun to accept
a new and diﬀerent needle design, patented the new needle and the needle-gun interface,
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connectors can require patient retraining and increase the risk of medical
error.242
D. Problems of Shallow Learning and Spread Expertise
Finally, divergent innovation decreases the depth of knowledge acquired and available about particular innovative products. Zachary Liskow
and Quentin Karpilow describe a broader pattern of innovation: Innovation is easier when knowledge stocks are concentrated, allowing future
innovators to exploit a basis of existing expertise.243 When innovations
diverge—driven by patent law doctrine or by other factors—we should
expect to see shallower knowledge stocks relevant to those innovations.
There are certainly benefits from broader knowledge; as elsewhere in this
story, tradeoﬀs exist. But decreased depth of knowledge comes with substantial costs. This section illustrates the problem of dispersed knowledge
with two examples: the EpiPen and the market for epinephrine autoinjectors, and me-too statins.
1. Dispersed User Knowledge. — Consider the EpiPen, which illustrates
the problem of divergent innovation leading to diﬀused patient knowledge and increased switching costs. The EpiPen, owned by Mylan and
manufactured by Pfizer, is an epinephrine auto-injector used to treat allergic reactions, including anaphylaxis, which can lead to shock, suﬀocation,
and death.244 It is a relatively simple device, including a fixed dose of
epinephrine, a needle, a spring, and a plastic housing including a retractable cap for the needle.245 And epinephrine itself has been a generic drug
for decades.246 Nevertheless, the EpiPen itself has seen little improvement.247
and reduced competition in the market through its patents. 157 F.3d 1340, 1367–72 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
242. See Lutz Heinemann & Lars Krinelke, Insulin Infusion Sets: The Achilles Heel of
Continuous Subcutaneous Insulin Infusion, 6 J. Diabetes Sci. & Tech. 954, 960–61 (2012).
243. Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate Law, 95
Wash. U. L. Rev. 387, 404–14 (2017) (discussing knowledge stocks and innovation path dependency in the context of clean energy technology). As noted above, the depth of existing
knowledge stocks and expertise can also have implications for the nonobviousness and
enablement doctrines; when more knowledge and understanding are available in a particular technological area, the PHOSITA is likely enabled to do more without undue experimentation, which also raises the bar for nonobvious innovations. Thus, these doctrines are
cyclically related to the social problem of shallow knowledge; nonobviousness pushes toward
divergent innovation, which then results in decreasing knowledge stocks and broadens the
set of potential innovations which are considered nonobvious. See supra sections II.A.2–.3;
see also Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 84, at 1648–51 (noting the relationship
between knowledge in the art, enablement, and nonobviousness).
244. See Meghana Keshavan, 5 Reasons Why No One Has Built a Better EpiPen, STAT
(Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/09/09/epipen-lack-of-innovation/ [https://
perma.cc/G28Q-SFRQ].
245. See id; see also EpiPen, Drugs.com, https://www.drugs.com/epipen-auto-injector.html
[https://perma.cc/7TE8-E3AZ] (last updated Jan. 4, 2019).
246. See Keshavan, supra note 244.
247. See id.
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Competitor innovation has mostly been divergent innovation, which has
been largely unsuccessful in reaching patients and has imposed costs when
it has because patients don’t know how to safely use the diﬀerent autoinjectors available.248
Competitors with the EpiPen have pursued divergent innovation to
avoid infringing the patents protecting it.249 Five related patents protect
the EpiPen, all expiring in 2025.250 The key element in the EpiPen autoinjector is a safety cap that surrounds the needle when the device is not in
use, automatically retracts when the device is jabbed against the thigh, and
then automatically returns to guard the needle and protect the user
against needle-sticks after use.251 The patents around this key design feature drive divergent innovation: As an auto-injector innovation consultant
put it, “It would not be very diﬃcult to create an EpiPen product, in terms
of engineering . . . . It’s not rocket science. It’s purely the patent that stops
us.”252
The Adrenaclick, the closest competitor, is just a little bit diﬀerent
than the EpiPen: a path of diﬀerentiating innovation. It has two safety caps
instead of one, and does not have an automatic shield that guards the
needle after use.253 The diﬀerences are minor, and certainly not improvements; it is hard to see a reason for them besides avoiding the EpiPen
patents, especially since the Adrenaclick was developed well after the
EpiPen.254 Another competitor has tried to tread this path even closer:
248. See id.; see also Carolyn Y. Johnson & Catherine Ho, How Mylan, the Maker of EpiPen,
Became a Virtual Monopoly, Wash. Post (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/2016/08/25/7f83728a-6aee-11e6-ba32-5a4bf5aad4fa_story.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
249. I do not claim that patents create the only incentives for product diﬀerentiation,
just that they create at least some incentives for such diﬀerentiation.
250. See U.S. Patent No. 7,449,012; U.S. Patent No. 7,794,432; U.S. Patent No. 8,048,035;
U.S. Patent No. 8,870,827; U.S. Patent No. 9,586,010; see also Orange Book: Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations: Patent and Exclusivity for: N019430,
FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=001&
Appl_No=019430&Appl_type=N [https://perma.cc/Z525-5KRN] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019)
(listing the patents granted for the EpiPen).
251. See How to Use an EpiPen, Mylan, https://www.epipen.com/-/media/files/epipen/
howtouseepipenautoinjector.pdf [https://perma.cc/4H5U-UMG2] (last visited Jan. 7, 2020).
252. See Keshavan, supra note 244 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Matthew
Allen, head of drug delivery for Cambridge Consultants).
253. How to Use Adrenaclick (Epinephrine Injection, USP Auto-Injector), Adrenaclick,
http://adrenaclick.com/how_to_use_adrenaclick_epinephrine_injection_USP_auto_injec
tor.php [https://perma.cc/55Y2-VEW9] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
254. The Adrenaclick was introduced in 2010. Adrenaclick Auto-Injector Launched for
Anaphylaxis, MPR ( Jan. 7, 2010), https://www.empr.com/home/news/adrenaclick-autoinjector-launched-for-anaphylaxis/ [https://perma.cc/69TE-59HG]. It is covered by one
patent, U.S. Patent No. 7,905,352, which expires in 2027. See Orange Book: Approved Drug
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations: Patent and Exclusivity for: N020800,
FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=003&
Appl_No=020800&Appl_type=N [https://perma.cc/Q8UV-5P33] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019)
(listing the patents for Adrenaclick).
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Teva sought approval to market a generic version of the EpiPen—but
Teva’s version had both a safety clip at one end and a removable cap
covering the needle end, in another eﬀort to design around Mylan’s patents but still make a device that could substitute for the EpiPen.255
The Auvi-Q, the third and final epinephrine auto-injector available in
the United States, pursued a path of exploring innovation, and is quite
different. In addition to a different form factor (the Adrenaclick and EpiPen
are both cylinders, while the Auvi-Q is shaped like a pack of playing cards),
the Auvi-Q uses a needle that automatically extends and retracts and uses
an electronic voice instruction system to guide patients.256 It also has a
single safety cap.257 The Auvi-Q’s substantial diﬀerences are reflected in its
larger patent portfolio; the Orange Book lists twenty-six patents covering
the Auvi-Q, the last of which expires in 2029.258
Slightly different technologies can create high switching costs through
decreased knowledge and the need for retraining. Although the diﬀerences between the EpiPen, Adrenaclick, and Auvi-Q are not especially
large, they matter a great deal to patients—especially children—who use
them in high-stress emergency situations. For example, the EpiPen requires users to remove one cap and the Adrenaclick requires users to
remove two caps; inadequate training can result in confusion, possibly
leading to mistakes that could result in injury or death.259 Unsurprisingly,
users—especially parents of children with allergies—do not wish to make
even small changes in using the devices. This desire to avoid the risk and
uncertainty associated with diﬀerentiating technological change can manifest in policy. Summer camps, for instance, may require that parents provide the EpiPen—and not a diﬀerent epinephrine auto-injector—because
they only train camp counselors on one type of auto-injector to avoid
confusion.260
255. Michael Gibney, Could EpiPen’s Plastic Cap Be Mylan’s Secret Weapon?, FiercePharma
(Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.fiercepharma.com/drug-delivery/could-a-plastic-cap-epipenhave-given-mylan-its-market-dominance [https://perma.cc/688X-UM6A]; see also Adam
Rubenfire, Mylan’s Fight Against Teva Highlights Logjam Created by FDA Petitions, Modern
Healthcare (Sept. 2, 2016), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160902/NEWS/
160909983/mylan-s-fight-against-teva-highlights-logjam-created-by-fda-petitions [https://
perma.cc/Q248-ZR2J].
256. See About Auvi-Q, Auvi-Q, https://www.auvi-q.com/about-auvi-q [https://perma.cc/
D6PK-32BN] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
257. Id.
258. See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence
Evaluations: Patent and Exclusivity for: N201739, FDA, https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/
cder/ob/patent_info.cfm?Product_No=003&Appl_No=201739&Appl_type=N [https://
perma.cc/J53T-82VM] (last visited Oct. 22, 2019) (listing patents for Auvi-Q).
259. Emily Willingham, Why Did Mylan Hike EpiPen Prices 400%? Because They Could,
Forbes (Aug. 21, 2016), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emilywillingham/2016/08/21/whydid-mylan-hike-epipen-prices-400-because-they-could/ [https://perma.cc/TW8F-4PX6].
260. Anna Edney, The U.S. Is Facing an EpiPen Shortage, Bloomberg (May 8, 2018)
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-08/patients-can-t-find-epipen-at-thepharmacy-as-supply-runs-short (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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FDA seems to have recognized the switching costs and the danger of
variety. When Teva filed its application to market a generic EpiPen, Mylan
filed a citizen petition requesting FDA to deny the application on the
grounds that the design diﬀerence (one cap versus two) would be unsafe
for device users.261 FDA denied Mylan’s citizen petition262—but then rejected Teva’s generic application all the same, citing “certain [unspecified]
major deficiencies.”263 Eventually, after public outcry over EpiPen costs
and eﬀorts by FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, FDA approved Teva’s twocap version.264
Shallow knowledge for divergent innovations—patients not knowing
much about the Adrenaclick or Auvi-Q—can also limit competition among
diﬀerent products. The EpiPen has long been the hugely dominant market leader.265 Its market leadership has resulted from several factors,
including allegedly anticompetitive conduct,266 but bolstering them has
been the fact that once you start using the EpiPen, the costs of switching
are high. And Mylan—smartly—has created an extensive program of providing free or discount EpiPens to schools (in contracts that limit schools’
purchases of competitive devices) so that consumers develop knowledge
about the EpiPen and not its competitors.267
Information-based limits on competition limit the benefits from
divergent innovation. Costs stay high; the EpiPen’s price went up over

261. Citizen Petition from Frank Casty, Head Glob. Med. Affairs, Mylan, to Div. of Dockets
Mgmt., FDA 3 ( Jan. 16, 2015), https://s3.amazonaws.com/assets.fiercemarkets.net/public/
005-LifeSciences/mylancitizenpetition1.16.15.pdf [https://perma.cc/A4BF-MRSX]. Mylan
filed a supplemental report claiming that users trained on the EpiPen could not use the
proposed device safely. Citizen Petition Supplement from Frank Casty, Head Glob. Med. Affairs,
Mylan, to Div. of Dockets Mgmt., FDA (Apr. 28, 2015), https://www.modernhealthcare.com/
assets/pdf/CH10683591.PDF [https://perma.cc/YL49-SGD3]. Others questioned the quality of the report. Ed Silverman, How Mylan Tried to Keep Teva from Selling a Generic
EpiPen, STAT (Aug. 31, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/pharmalot/2016/08/31/mylanteva-generic-epipen/ [https://perma.cc/Z7MJ-26NL].
262. Kieran Meagher, Note, Abuse of the Hatch-Waxman Act: Mylan’s Ability to
Monopolize Reflects Major Weaknesses, 11 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 589, 603 (2016).
263. See Carly Helfand, FDA Swats Down Teva’s EpiPen Copy, Putting Mylan in Cruise
Control, FiercePharma (Mar. 1, 2016), https://www.fiercepharma.com/sales-and-marketing/
fda-swats-down-teva-s-epipen-copy-putting-mylan-cruise-control [https://perma.cc/LHU6NGYW].
264. Press Release, FDA, FDA Approves First Generic Version of EpiPen (Aug. 16, 2018),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/press-announcements/fda-approves-first-generic-versionepipen [https://perma.cc/UG5V-UPPV] [hereinafter FDA, Generic Version of EpiPen].
265. See generally Carrier & Minniti, supra note 20 (describing EpiPen’s dominance
and the tactics underlying that dominance).
266. See generally id.
267. See Pauline Bartolone, EpiPen’s Dominance Driven by Competitor’s Stumbles and
Tragic Deaths, NPR (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2016/09/
07/492964464/epipen-s-dominance-driven-by-competitors-stumbles-and-tragic-deaths
[https://perma.cc/Q9E3-NG8J].
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400% in seven years, resulting in outcry and Congressional hearings268
(which didn’t impact its price).269 A second problem arises when the sole
source runs into manufacturing problems; EpiPen manufacturing problems led to shortages in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United
States in 2018.270
Of course, one version of this story goes that this is exactly what patents
are supposed to do. EpiPen has a patent on its technology; it gets something like a monopoly; it makes a lot of money; and that ex post reward is
what motivates the ex ante research that goes into developing a lifesaving
technology. We wait for the patent to expire, and everyone is better oﬀ. Of
course, this story poses problems for the EpiPen.271 But that’s not the point
I’m making here. The story of the EpiPen demonstrates how the classical
narrative of market selection for superior devices can provide an inadequate description of real innovation and market dynamics.272 In particular,
divergent innovation, whether diﬀerentiating or exploring, can create
substantial costs for consumers because of shallow information, incompatibility, and switching costs among otherwise substitutable products. These
costs, moreover, can lead to an absence of market competition and the
absence of even the putative benefits of innovative divergence.
More generally, product variety means that users are less likely to
know how to use any particular product and more likely to encounter costs
when switching from more familiar to less familiar. This may be the case
for patients, as with the EpiPen and its competitors, or for providers, who
may know less about each individual drug available for prescription, and
who may face decision costs when choosing between options.
2. Spread Knowledge. — Shallow knowledge doesn’t only aﬄict consumers; providers and drug-makers alike can face problems from shallow
knowledge, as the case of me-too drugs demonstrates.273 When diﬀerent
268. Katie Thomas, Mylan’s Chief Is Chastised by Lawmakers Questioning EpiPen
Pricing, N.Y. Times (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/22/business/mylanchief-to-insist-epipen-is-priced-fairly-at-house-hearing.html (on file with the Columbia Law
Review); Willingham, supra note 259 (cataloging financial and human costs).
269. Charles Duhigg, Outcry Over EpiPen Prices Hasn’t Made Them Lower, N.Y. Times
(June 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/04/business/angry-about-epipen-pricesexecutive-dont-care-much.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
270. Edney, supra note 260.
271. See Carrier & Minniti, supra note 20, at 55–56 (recounting the manufacturing and
distribution history of the EpiPen and noting Mylan’s near monopoly on the market); id. at
59–71 (describing Mylan’s anticompetitive actions in the fields of patent litigation settlements, FDA citizen petitions, and exclusive contracts with schools); Keshavan, supra note
244 (summarizing the technological, financial, and regulatory incentives against improving
the EpiPen); Katie Thomas, Mylan to Settle EpiPen Overpricing Case for $465 Million, N.Y.
Times (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/08/business/epipen-mylan-justicedepartment-settlement.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the federal
government’s concerns about Mylan allegedly misclassifying the EpiPen as a generic and
overcharging Medicaid).
272. See supra notes 7–11 and accompanying text.
273. See supra section III.B.1.
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me-too drugs are developed, each drug requires clinical trials for approval,274 broadening the set of class-related clinical trials but resulting in less
information gathered about each individual drug. To the extent that realworld data are collected based on ongoing drug use in the context of a
learning health system, dispersed use of diﬀerent statins also ensures that
we learn relatively less about any one drug.275 And when providers are
choosing whether to prescribe a new statin, they must rely on the limited
set of information generated in clinical trials, rather than whatever information has been gathered through years of clinical practice and adverse
event reporting.276
Having multiple drugs available does have benefits. Competition can
reduce prices (though as discussed above, this price reduction is limited).277 Learning how diﬀerent patients respond to diﬀerent drugs can
lead to more precise medical practice.278 And there may be benefits to
having a broader armamentarium of drugs available for treatment—
though this argument is weakened by evidence that providers rarely use
the breadth of that armamentarium, perhaps because of information and
familiarity concerns.279
Overall, whether related to knowledge, interoperability, or inventingaround costs, divergent innovation creates costs that counterbalance at
least some of its benefits. These costs are especially worrisome when divergent benefits are limited; the next Part discusses how diﬀerent incentives
for biomedical innovation can limit the potential upside of divergent
innovation.

274. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (2012).
275. See W. Nicholson Price II, Drug Approval in a Learning Health System, 102 Minn.
L. Rev. 2413, 2414, 2437–45 (2018) [hereinafter Price, Drug Approval] (describing the process of collecting data about drugs in learning health systems to allow for deeper learning
about drugs in clinical care).
276. Gagne & Choudry, supra note 173, at 712.
277. See supra notes 197–202 and accompanying text.
278. See, Price, Drug Approval, supra note 275, at 2433–34 (“[C]linical trials, with their
inherent limits, simply don’t provide all the information the health system needs to provide
the best care.”).
279. See Peter C. Austin, Muhammad M. Mamdani & David N. Juurlink, How Many “MeToo” Drugs Are Enough? The Case of Physician Preferences for Specific Statins, 40 Ann.
Pharmacotherapy 1047, 1048 (2006) (finding that in a large sample of Ontario doctors, the
average doctor wrote 94.9% of prescriptions for just one or two statins; thus half of all
doctors only ever prescribed one or two). For some diseases, like psychiatric conditions or
HIV/AIDS, this argument holds more force. See, e.g., HIV Drug Resistance, Avert (Oct. 10,
2019), https://www.avert.org/professionals/hiv-programming/treatment/drug-resistance
[https://perma.cc/HDR9-64PV] (describing the threat of HIV drug resistance partially
caused by providers continuing to prescribe a less eﬀective treatment regimen); Mental
Health Medications, Nat’l Inst. Mental Health, https://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/topics/
mental-health-medications/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/VN6G-6Z7Y] (last updated Oct.
2016) (describing diﬀerent kinds of psychiatric medication and the need to try multiple
variations to find a drug with manageable side eﬀects for eﬀective treatment).
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IV. PATENT DIVERGENCE IN CONTEXT
Patents act in context. Innovation incentives do not exist in a vacuum.
For biomedical technologies, in particular, a wide set of additional incentive mechanisms shape the direction of innovation. Grants create funding
for research,280 FDA-administered data or market exclusivity give additional protection for drugs or biologics,281 prizes create ex post rewards set
by prize administrators rather than the market,282 and reimbursement
policies shape how the market pays—or doesn’t—for biomedical technologies.283 These diﬀerent incentives can also push innovation to diverge, or
not. Biomedical innovation is not unique in this regard; other innovation
fields have their own incentive landscapes. A full canvassing of the influences of diﬀerent innovation incentives awaits future work, but the next
sections discuss two key mechanisms to illustrate how other incentives can
interact with patent law’s incentives for divergent innovation: FDA approval and insurer reimbursement.
A.

FDA Approval

Most biomedical technologies require FDA approval to be marketed
and sold,284 and the approval process can be extremely expensive. Estimates of the cost of winning FDA approval for a new drug range widely
and are contested but are typically thought to be at least several hundred

280. See generally Price, Grants, supra note 14 (describing the role of grants in funding
research).
281. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Role of the FDA, supra note 76, at 359–64 (explaining FDA
“pseudo-patents”); Yaniv Heled, Regulatory Competitive Shelters, 76 Ohio St. L.J. 299, 336–
53 (2015) (surveying FDA’s competition-limiting practices). Because these FDA-administered
exclusivity periods are greatest for new chemical entities and new biologics—that is, for new
products, not new uses for old products—these periods, too, create incentives for pursuing
divergent innovation over deepening innovation. See Heled, supra, at 341, 351. But see
Erika Lietzan, The Myths of Data Exclusivity, 20 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 91, 103–20 (2016)
(arguing that data exclusivity is the wrong framing).
282. See, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, Intellectual Property Versus Prizes: Reframing the
Debate, 81 U. Chi. L. Rev. 999, 1001–07 (2014) [hereinafter Roin, Intellectual Property]
(reviewing the literature on prize systems). Prizes, while of substantial theoretical interest to
innovation law scholars, are relatively small in terms of dollars at stake. See Price, Grants,
supra note 14, at 3 (describing how governments spend far more on grants than on prizes).
283. See Roin, Intellectual Property, supra note 282, at 1040–41; Rachel E. Sachs, Prizing
Insurance: Prescription Drug Insurance as Innovation Incentive, 30 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 153,
178–93 (2016) [hereinafter Sachs, Prizing Insurance].
284. A notable exception is the category of laboratory-developed tests, which are diagnostics developed and administered in a single laboratory. Laboratory Developed Tests, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/vitro-diagnostics/laboratory-developed-tests [https://
perma.cc/R92X-WPXY] (last updated Sept. 29, 2018).
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million dollars.285 Approval for a new biologic is similarly expensive.286
Approval for new medical devices (those that require premarket approval)
is less expensive but still costs millions of dollars.287 Unsurprisingly, approval costs are a substantial hurdle in developing a new technology.288 In a
way, these costs reflect an FDA requirement for deepening innovation by
requiring substantial data about the functioning, safety, and eﬃcacy of a
chemical that was patented for a particular use long before. Nevertheless,
the process is exceedingly costly. The possibility of avoiding these substantial approval costs can thus create substantial incentives for innovation.289
Some FDA approval or clearance pathways drive divergent innovation
like patent law does. FDA has programs that reduce the regulatory burden
of approval for drugs that fill unmet medical needs: Fast Track and
Accelerated Approval.290 These programs create incentives for drug developers to pursue exploring innovation. Easier review can also come with
the demonstration of significant improvement over existing technology
through the Breakthrough Therapy or Priority Review pathways.291 A
Breakthrough Device category similarly eases the regulatory burden for
devices when either there is no existing approved or cleared treatment, or
the new device oﬀers “significant advantages.”292 On the other hand, FDA
might also prioritize improvement and review purely me-too drugs more

285. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi, Henry G. Grabowski & Ronald W. Hansen, Innovation
in the Pharmaceutical Industry: New Estimates of R&D Costs, 47 J. Health Econ. 20, 31
(2016) (estimating costs of over $2 billion); Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note 283, at 163
n.45 (describing varying estimates and controversy). These estimates include the costs of
clinical trials, FDA approval itself, and the cost of capital. However, the entire process is
shaped by FDA requirements; faster pathways can reduce not only administrative burdens
but also the costs of clinical trials. See Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note 283, at 163–64.
286. See infra section IV.A.2.
287. See infra notes 300–302 and accompanying text.
288. See Eisenberg, Role of the FDA, supra note 76, at 356–57 (“Like other costly
regulatory regimes, FDA regulation serves as a barrier to entry . . . .”); Roin, Unpatentable
Drugs, supra note 2, at 505 (describing the “immense investment” needed to secure FDA
approval).
289. For instance, Priority Review Vouchers, which promise access to a faster approval process by FDA, have sold on the open market for well over $100 million. See Alexander Gaffney,
Michael Mezher & Zachary Brennan, Regulatory Explainer: Everything You Need to Know
About FDA’s Priority Review Vouchers, RAPS: Regulatory Focus, https://www.raps.org/
regulatory-focus/news-articles/2017/12/regulatory-explainer-everything-you-need-to-knowabout-fdas-priority-review-vouchers [https://perma.cc/7Y8P-9GSP] (last updated Dec. 20, 2019)
(arguing that eﬀorts to avoid substantial approval costs can create substantial incentives for
innovation).
290. Fast Track, Breakthrough Therapy, Accelerated Approval, Priority Review, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/ForPatients/Approvals/Fast/default.htm [https://perma.cc/X4F2-77WG]
(last updated Feb. 23, 2018).
291. See id.
292. See 21st Century Cures Act, Pub. L. No. 114-255, § 3051(a), 130 Stat. 1033, 1121–
22 (2016).
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closely for safety problems if they oﬀer no clinical improvement, though
its general standard is safety and eﬃcacy, not comparative improvement.293
FDA also has pathways that create powerful incentives for firms to
avoid divergent innovation. This section considers two: (1) the premarket
clearance and approval pathways for medical devices and (2) the biosimilar approval process.
1. Getting Medical Devices on the Market. — FDA allows some medical
devices onto the market through abbreviated processes that discourage
divergent innovation. FDA classifies all medical devices into one of three
regulatory control categories (I, II, or III) based on their level of risk and
complexity.294 Class I devices are subject to general controls that are applicable to all devices; Class II devices require more assurance of safety and
effectiveness because general controls, by themselves, are insufficient; Class
III devices present potential unreasonable risk of illness or injury and are
subject to premarket approval to assure safety and eﬀectiveness.295
The 510(k) premarket clearance process aims to streamline FDA’s
regulatory scheme. When devices are neither so high-risk as to require premarket approval nor so low-risk as to be exempted from premarket clearance or approval requirements, they can undergo the 510(k) clearance
process.296 Under this process, FDA evaluates whether a device is “substantially equivalent” to a legally marketed Class II predicate device.297
In contrast to the premarket approval process, which directly requires
a reasonable assurance of safety and eﬀectiveness, “substantial equivalence” is a comparative standard. It requires that “the device has the same
intended use as the predicate device” and either (a) the device “has the
same technological characteristics as the predicate device,” or (b) if the
new device has diﬀerent technological characteristics, information298 submitted by the device sponsor “demonstrates that the device is as safe and
eﬀective as a legally marketed device, and . . . does not raise diﬀerent

293. See The FDA’s Drug Review Process: Ensuring Drugs Are Safe and Eﬀective, FDA,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-information-consumers/fdas-drug-review-process-ensuringdrugs-are-safe-and-eﬀective [https://perma.cc/6DZG-8P82] (last updated Nov. 24, 2017).
294. See FDA, The 510(k) Program: Evaluating Substantial Equivalence in Premarket
Notifications [510(k)]: Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staﬀ 2
(2014), https://www.fda.gov/media/82395/download (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
[hereinafter FDA, Substantial Equivalence Guidance].
295. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1) (2012).
296. FDA, Substantial Equivalence Guidance, supra note 294, at 2–4.
297. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i). There is also a de novo classification process, which allows
sponsors to seek lower-risk classifications even when there is no substantially equivalent
predicate device that would permit using the 510(k) pathway. De Novo Classification Request,
FDA, https://www.fda.gov/medical-devices/premarket-submissions/de-novo-classificationrequest [https://perma.cc/W8E2-4RZS] (last updated Sept. 6, 2019).
298. This information may include “appropriate clinical or scientific data if deemed
necessary.” 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i)(1)(A)(ii)(I).
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questions of safety and eﬀectiveness than the predicate device.”299 FDA
may clear devices under the 510(k) pathway even if they are different enough
that they may be independently patented, but they must still be close
enough for FDA to find them substantially equivalent.
The 510(k) pathway is substantially cheaper than the premarket approval pathway. On average, firms spend $94 million taking a device through
the premarket approval pathway ($75 million on the FDA process itself),
and $31 million to take a device through the 510(k) pathway ($24 million
at FDA).300 The premarket approval pathway is also longer than the 510(k)
pathway; it typically takes over 400 days,301 compared with around 200 days
for a 510(k) preclearance.302
Thus, as Lisa Suter and colleagues argue, “Since [510(k)] regulatory
approval hinges on claims of similarity to previously approved devices, the
process may encourage the development of devices that provide only small
improvements at higher cost than their predecessors.”303 Because the
510(k) preclearance process is so much cheaper, and requires that devices
be substantially equivalent to existing devices, the overall FDA approval
process creates substantial incentives for firms to diverge less from existing
medical device technologies.304
299. Id. at § 360c(i)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). The 510(k) clearance pathway has defied advocate
arguments that it should be eliminated. See, e.g., Gregory D. Curfman & Rita F. Redberg,
Medical Devices—Balancing Innovation and Regulation, 365 New Eng. J. Med. 975, 976–77
(2011); IOM Says Get Rid of 510k Approval FDA Responds Not So Fast, U.S. Med. ( Jan. 10,
2012), http://www.usmedicine.com/hhs-and-usphs/fda/iom-says-get-rid-of-510k-approvalfda-responds-not-so-fast [https://perma.cc/N74T-UNH2]. Instead, FDA is looking to implement more thorough post-market surveillance. Scott Gottlieb, Advancing Policies to Promote
Safe, Effective MedTech Innovation, FDA (Dec. 11, 2018), https://www.fda.gov/news-events/
fda-voices-perspectives-fda-leadership-and-experts/advancing-policies-promote-safe-effectivemedtech-innovation [https://perma.cc/LJ9E-SRLE] (describing new reforms that involve
monitoring and follow-up studies).
300. Josh Makower, Aabed Meer & Lyn Denend, FDA Impact on U.S. Medical Technology
Innovation: A Survey of Over 200 Medical Technology Companies 7 (2010), https://www.advamed.org/
sites/default/files/resource/30_10_11_10_2010_Study_CAgenda_makowerreportfinal.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BQY7-WUE2].
301. Elaine Silvestrini, Premarket Approval (PMA), Drugwatch, https://www.drugwatch.com/
fda/premarket-approval [https://perma.cc/G4SA-5LAU] (last visited Oct. 16, 2019).
302. Emergo, How Long It Takes the US FDA to Clear Medical Devices Via the 510(k)
Process 5 (2017), https://www.emergogroup.com/sites/default/files/emergo-fda-510k-dataanalysis-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/58TE-YKSP].
303. Lisa G. Suter, A. David Paltiel, Benjamin N. Rome, Daniel H. Solomon, Ilya Golovaty,
Hanna Gerlovin, Jeﬀrey N. Katz & Elena Losina, Medical Device Innovation—Is “Better”
Good Enough?, 365 New Eng. J. Med. 1464, 1464 (2011).
304. See Richard Williams, Robert Graboyes & Adam Thierer, US Medical Devices: Choices
and Consequences 13 (2015), https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/Williams-MedicalDevices.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5H2-S77V] (explaining why a manufacturer would make
products similar to existing ones to use the 510(k) process); Kyle M. Fargen, Donald Frei,
David Fiorella, Cameron G. McDougall, Philip M. Meyers, Joshua A. Hirsch & J. Mocco, The
FDA Approval Process for Medical Devices: An Inherently Flawed System or a Valuable
Pathway for Innovation?, 5 J. NeuroInterventional Surgery 269, 271 (2013) (“A Premarketing
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Not all medical devices are approved through standard device procedures; combination devices that contain both a drug and a device may be
approved instead through a drug approval process, such as a New Drug
Application or an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA).305 Epinephrine auto-injectors, described above, are such combination devices.306
FDA has noted the need for similarity for those devices should they seek
approval through the shorter, cheaper ANDA: If the product is used by
patients independently, especially in emergency situations (like autoinjectors), FDA will ask whether patients can safely switch to the generic
“without retraining by a physician or health care professional.”307 This
pathway therefore oﬀers cheaper, more expeditious device approval to
devices that hew very closely to existing technology. Teva tried, and failed,
to bring a generic version of the EpiPen, slightly modified to avoid patent
infringement, to market through exactly this process.308
2. The Biosimilar Approval Pathway. — FDA’s pathway for biosimilar
approval also creates incentives for firms to stray less from existing technology, partially undermining patent incentives for divergent innovation.309
Biologics are a class of therapeutics, often proteins, produced by living
cells and then purified.310 The biosimilar pathway aims to encourage firms
to develop products that are nearly copies of existing biologics to increase
competition and decrease prices.311
The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA), passed
as part of the Aﬀordable Care Act, creates a pathway whereby firms can
Notification (510(k)) is a fast-track process wherein applicants must demonstrate that the
device to be marketed (moderate risk or Class II) is ‘substantially equivalent’ to a preexisting legally-marketed device (predicate) in terms of safety and eﬀectiveness.”); see also
Keshavan, supra note 244 (citing Matthew Allen, head of drug delivery for Cambridge
Consultants, for his claim that FDA “rules keep consumers safe [b]ut . . . also make it diﬃcult to come up with design that can meet the standards—without infringing on Mylan’s
patent”).
305. See, e.g., Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research, FDA, Comparative Analyses and
Related Comparative Use Human Factors Studies for a Drug-Device Combination Product
Submitted in an ANDA: Draft Guidance for Industry 1 n.2, 4–5 (2017), https://www.fda.gov/
media/102349/download [https://perma.cc/Z3SB-Y4WQ] (describing supporting data
needed to file for an ANDA for a combination device).
306. FDA, Generic Version of EpiPen, supra note 264.
307. Letter from Janet Woodcock, Dir., FDA Ctr. for Drug Evaluation and Research, to
Thomas K. Rogers, III, Exec. Vice President, Regulatory Aﬀairs, King Pharmaceuticals 6
( July 29, 2009), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=FDA-2007-P-0128-0006 (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
308. See Rubenfire, supra note 255; supra section III.D.1.
309. One may quibble with whether there is actually “innovation” going on here—are
the follow-on companies actually innovating or just copying something that already exists?
Nevertheless, to the extent that the biosimilar pathway explicitly and deliberately pushes
some companies to pursue development pathways that diverge not at all from prior products, it counteracts some of the incentives created by patent law’s premium on divergence.
310. See W. Nicholson Price II & Arti K. Rai, Manufacturing Barriers to Biologics
Competition and Innovation, 101 Iowa L. Rev. 1023, 1032–33 (2016).
311. See id. at 1028–29.
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develop approximate copies of biologics and pursue a more streamlined
approval pathway.312 Current technology does not allow exact copies of
biologics; they are too complicated for the tools we have available.313 The
BPCIA therefore creates an easier path for companies to win approval for
biologics that are very similar to existing biologics (thus, “biosimilars”).314
The biosimilar approval pathway oﬀers substantial savings: Biosimilar
approval costs around $100–250 million, while approval for an innovator
biologic costs around $1 billion or more.315 The pathway is also shorter
and less risky because FDA and the biosimilar company both know that the
innovator biologic actually works.316 Although the biosimilar pathway does
not permit marketing while patents protect the original biologic, firms
develop biosimilars while those patents are still in force, waiting to market
them either until the patents expire, are invalidated through litigation, or
are licensed.317
This pathway for biosimilar approval creates incentives for firms to
avoid divergent innovation. If firms pursue versions of biologics that already exist, they face lower development costs, lower risk, and an easier
pathway to approval. These incentives may counterbalance the patent
incentives to pursue diﬀerentiating or exploring innovations—though in
some cases, both incentives can be relevant, as when firms develop biosimilars that are close enough to follow the FDA biosimilar approval pathway
312. See id. at 1040–42.
313. See id. at 1034–37 (noting the lack of available tools for precisely identifying and
copying the characteristics of biologics); id. at 1039 (noting the regulatory incentives for
innovator firms to avoid developing the fundamental knowledge to be able to characterize
biologics fully).
314. Id. at 1040.
315. Id. at 1049; see also Thomas Sullivan, A Tough Road: Cost to Develop One New
Drug Is $2.6 Billion; Approval Rate for Drugs Entering Clinical Development Is Less Than
12%, Pol’y & Med. (Mar. 21, 2019), https://www.policymed.com/2014/12/a-tough-roadcost-to-develop-one-new-drug-is-26-billion-approval-rate-for-drugs-entering-clinical-de.html
[https://perma.cc/YUJ5-YEL4].
316. Note that the pathway still has substantial problems, including the possibility that
trade secrets about manufacturing processes will substantially limit innovation. See Price &
Rai, supra note 310, at 1046–48 (describing this dynamic generally); W. Nicholson Price II,
Regulating Secrecy, 91 Wash. L. Rev. 1769, 1791–92 (2016) (describing the interactions
between trade secrecy and tight regulatory definitions that make the former especially powerful in this context).
317. The BPCIA includes elaborate patent-related provisions. See Erika Hanson, Biosimilars,
Shall We Do the Patent Dance?, U. Utah S.J. Quinney C.L. ( Jan. 24, 2019), https://law.utah.
edu/biosimilars-shall-we-do-the-patent-dance [https://perma.cc/F3TN-YY8E] (“The patent
dance will begin when the manufacturer of a biosimilar submits an application with
[FDA] . . . . The two parties then go back and forth on which patents are infringed upon . . .
[allowing them] to litigate the patent infringement issues before the biosimilar is on the
market.”); see also Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen, 137 S. Ct. 1664, 1670–72, 1674–76 (2017) (describing the so-called “patent dance” and holding it not enforceable by injunction under
the terms of the BPCIA itself). Companies developing biosimilars are immunized from
patent infringement liability for activities related to seeking eventual FDA approval under
the safe harbor of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2012).
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but, for instance, use a slightly diﬀerent manufacturing process to avoid
patents held by the original biologic developer.318 Overall, these procedures reduce incentives for divergent biomedical innovation.
B.

Reimbursement

Insurance reimbursement procedures can similarly create incentives
against divergent innovation in biomedical technologies. This section focuses on the basics of reimbursement for medical devices.319 In essence, it
is often easier to obtain coverage for products that are similar to devices
already covered by insurers. This may be because payers are already familiar with the technology, so that knowledge acquisition is easier, or it may
simply be because administrative barriers to payment have already been
surmounted by an earlier product.320
The process of obtaining reimbursement for a new medical product
is not trivial. New products need to be assigned a “code,” which is used by
providers to indicate which product is being used and how it should be
reimbursed.321 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)322
318. See Ctr. for Drug Evaluation & Research & Ctr. for Drug Biologics Evaluation &
Research, FDA, Development of Therapeutic Protein Biosimilars: Comparative Analytical
Assessment and Other Quality-Related Considerations 11–12 (2019), https://www.fda.gov/
media/125484/download [https://perma.cc/C5UJ-BDWM] (describing application requirements for diﬀering manufacturing processes for biosimilar biologics). Duplicating manufacturing methods is challenging, and many aspects are held as trade secrets instead of patents,
compounding that diﬃculty. See Price & Rai, supra note 310, at 1046–48. However, in those
instances when manufacturing methods patents do exist, those patents are sometimes easier
to enforce against biosimilar applicants under the “patent dance” provisions of the BPCIA,
which allow the original biologic sponsor to examine the biosimilar applicant’s application,
including manufacturing methods, to evaluate potential patent infringement. See id. at
1053–54. But see Sandoz, 137 S. Ct. at 1664, 1676 (finding that the disclosure of a biosimilar
application in the “patent dance” is optional under the BPCIA).
319. Drug reimbursement has its own complications, including the existence of true
generic products, automatic substitution, tiered formularies, pharmacy benefit managers,
and mandates to cover certain types of drugs. For an introduction to some of the mechanics
of drug reimbursement, see Rachel E. Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, 102 Minn. L. Rev.
2307, 2311–21 (2018) [hereinafter Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement] (describing linkages
between FDA approval and insurance reimbursement); Sachs, Prizing Insurance, supra note
283, 178–93 (describing reimbursement and arguing it should be used as an innovation
policy lever).
320. See Marcia Nusgart, HCPCS Coding: An Integral Part of Your Reimbursement
Strategy, 2 Advances in Wound Care 576, 578 (2013) (explaining how substantially equivalent devices may be placed on the same HCPCS code).
321. See Tiffini Diage, NAMSA, Planning for Successful Medical Device Reimbursement:
So Your Device Is Cleared, Now What? 3–4 (2015), https://www.namsa.com/wp-content/
uploads/2015/10/NAMSA-Planning-for-Successful-Medical-Device-Reimbursement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XPG-TKPE] (“Coding is the language of CMS, private payers, facilities,
and physicians. Coding translates into payment. Without a proper code, procedures and
products are not paid for.”); Fee for Service, HealthCare.gov, https://www.healthcare.gov/
glossary/fee-for-service/ [https://perma.cc/SJ6N-JL5G] (last visited Oct. 14, 2019).
322. I focus on CMS in this section, but private insurers typically follow CMS’s lead. See
Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Innovators’ Guide to Navigating Medicare 7 (2015),
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relies on codes to process reimbursement and to set rates; for instance, the
Level II Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System identifies durable
medical equipment used outside physician’s offices, among other things.323
If a technology is relatively similar to an existing product, then it can
sometimes just use the existing code, which requires relatively little eﬀort
or risk.324 If the new technology is further afield, though, getting reimbursement can require requesting that CMS modify the code, or create an
entirely new code for the new technology.325 But this process often fails—
in 2017, CMS approved only three of ten requests for code modifications
for medical devices and only ten of seventy-two requests for new codes for
medical devices.326 Even when the process is successful, it typically takes at
least a year.327 Industry actors have formally complained to the Secretary
of Health and Human Services about the diﬃculty of getting new codes
created.328
Obtaining a code does not guarantee reimbursement; the developer
of a new technology must also obtain a favorable coverage determination.329
Coverage determinations, whether “local” or national, request that
Medicare provide “the formal instruction to the Medicare claims processing
contractors regarding how to process claims (e.g., when to pay, when not
to pay, pay only when certain clinical conditions are met).”330 For an item
to be eligible for coverage, it must be within the categories of established
benefits, not specifically excluded from coverage, and “reasonable and
necessary.”331 Coverage determinations also consider whether the device is
a breakthrough technology or medically beneficial and available when
other medically beneficial alternatives are not available or covered by
Medicare.332 Coverage determinations can thus promote divergence, if no
other product is available or if the new product uses a diﬀerent clinical
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coverage/CouncilonTechInnov/Downloads/InnovatorsGuide-Master-7-23-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4T9-FSU4] [hereinafter Innovators’ Guide].
323. See Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Healthcare Common Procedure Coding
System (HCPCS) Level II Coding Procedures 1 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/
Coding/MedHCPCSGenInfo/Downloads/2018-11-30-HCPCS-Level2-Coding-Procedure.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EZD3-ZZBA] [hereinafter Coding Procedures].
324. See Innovators’ Guide, supra note 322, at 4.
325. See id. at 16–18 (describing the creation of new codes).
326. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Level II Coding Decisions for the 2017–
2018 Coding Cycle (2018), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coding/MedHCPCSGenInfo/
Downloads/2017-2018-HCPCS-Coding-Decisions.zip (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
327. Innovators’ Guide, supra note 322, at 5.
328. E-mail from All. for HCPCS II Coding Reform to Tom Price, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of
Health & Human Servs. & Seema Verma, Adm’r, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs. (Aug.
15, 2017), https://www.aahd.us/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/HCPCSCodingReform
Medicare082017letterHHS.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3CB-YB8B].
329. Innovators’ Guide, supra note 322, at 3–4, 16.
330. Id. at 13.
331. Id. at 11.
332. Medicare Program; Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,124,
31,125 (proposed May 16, 2000) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. § 405).
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modality. But convincing the Medicare Administrative Contractors that
make local coverage determinations means demonstrating that the new
technology works and is “reasonable and necessary”—and that process is
easiest when the new technology is not too far from what the clinicians
already know.333
Sometimes, the incentives against substantial diﬀerence are even
more obvious. According to a 1984 report by the Oﬃce of Technology
Assessment, when the Veterans Administration set standards for wheelchairs that it would buy, it historically wrote them “with a specific wheelchair in mind, usually an Everest & Jennings, Inc. (E&J) model.”334 Other
manufacturers that wanted “to obtain VA contracts may have [needed] to
make products similar to the E&J wheelchair” because “products were
often evaluated on the basis of how closely they conformed to E&J’s
model.”335
Thus, getting reimbursement—like winning FDA approval—can
create incentives for innovators to avoid more divergent technological
approaches.336 This pattern does not always hold—truly breakthrough
technologies are specifically recognized as appropriate for coverage
determinations, and when an innovator does get a new code, the innovator
may be able to negotiate higher reimbursement rates for the new technology, with no pricing anchor of rates set for an older technology.337 But the
most straightforward path to obtaining a code and coverage, minimizing

333. See Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making National Coverage Determinations,
78 Fed. Reg. 48,164, 48,164–65 (Aug. 7, 2013) (“NCDs serve as generally applicable rules to
ensure that similar claims for items or services are covered in the same manner.”).
334. Donald S. Shepard & Sarita L. Karen, The Market for Wheelchairs: Innovations
and Federal Policy 27 (1984), https://ota.fas.org/reports/8418.pdf [https://perma.cc/
EY4G-5DEX].
335. Id.
336. Manufacturers may also deprioritize significant diﬀerences as a way to avoid liability in the presence of third-party payers who are less performance sensitive. Christopher
Buccafusco, Disability and Design, N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 19–22),
https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3497902 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (making this point in the context of motorized wheelchairs).
337. One trade magazine explains the issue this way:
If your product is placed in a HCPCS code that does not include similar
products with similar manufacturer’s suggested retail price (MSRPs),
then the reimbursement established for it by the payer could be inappropriate and thus, not be prescribed or used. For instance, if the retail price
for your surgical dressing is $25.00 and the HCPCS code that was assigned
to your product had a Medicare reimbursement amount of $17.00, it may
be likely that a supplier may choose a different company’s product to
purchase that is closer to or less than $17.00. Thus, this HCPCS code may
not be appropriate for the product, since the reimbursement rate is not
adequate and including it in this code would not allow patient access to
your product.
Nusgart, supra note 320, at 577–78.
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at least procedural costs, is to follow fairly closely the technologies that
have gone before and avoid divergent innovation.
C.

Interactions

Incentives for and against divergent innovation can interact in problematic ways, and biomedical innovation is rich with examples. Patent law
pushes toward divergent innovation—either diﬀerentiating innovation or,
if the nonobviousness requirement works well, exploring innovation. On
the other hand, FDA and reimbursement incentives can push against
divergent innovation, driving innovators to hew closely to existing technology. Figure 2 shows these counteracting incentives. The result can be an
unhappy middle in which firms spend resources on minor variations,338
building parallel but shallow knowledge bases, and creating interoperability problems—bringing all the costs of divergence but only limited benefits
from technological advances.
FIGURE 2: IMPACTS OF PATENT, FDA, AND INSURANCE
INCENTIVES ON INNOVATION339

Slightly diﬀerent medical devices follow this pattern. Patent law
pushes inventors to make medical devices diﬀerent from each other so

338. See Janet Freilich, The Paradox of Legal Equivalents and Scientific Equivalence:
Reconciling Patent Law’s Doctrine of Equivalents with the FDA’s Bioequivalence Requirement,
66 SMU L. Rev. 59, 78–82 (2013); Janet Freilich, Patent Infringement in the Context of
Follow-On Biologics, 16 Stan. Tech. L. Rev. 9, 26–30 (2012) (discussing this type of dynamic
in the drug and biologic contexts).
339. Novelty promotes differentiating or exploring innovation, and nonobviousness
furthers exploring innovation when it works well—but the arrow for nonobviousness fades
to mirror its relative weakness in biomedical innovation. FDA approval and insurance reimbursement both create incentives for less-divergent innovation—that is, for differentiating
rather than exploring innovation.
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that they can receive patent protection.340 But receiving FDA approval is
far less costly through the 510(k) pathway if the inventor can demonstrate
that the resulting product is substantially equivalent to an alreadyapproved product—that is, if the innovation is closer to diﬀerentiating
innovation than exploring innovation.341 Similarly, receiving reimbursement approval from insurance companies is substantially easier if the new
device can be reimbursed under an existing code rather than requiring
the development and approval of a new code.342 The result can easily be
diﬀerentiating innovation that doesn’t advance the field but creates substantial costs.
The point isn’t that drugs or other biomedical technologies pursued
through divergent innovation are never going to work, or are never going
to be better than earlier products—of course some are. Divergent innovation can and does lead to great advances. But patent law can create incentives to pursue divergent innovation even if it doesn’t lead to great
advances—even if it’s not expected to lead to any advance at all.
Sometimes, with biomedical technologies, it doesn’t even matter
whether a new technology works better or not. Vinay Prasad and colleagues make this point generally.343 They argue that the way cancer drugs
are regulated and reimbursed in the United States, with relatively low
standards for approval and high reimbursement rates, means that
“[e]mbarking on unpromising trials agendas that involve testing marginally eﬀective or even ineﬀective drugs, is now potentially profitable . . .
because the reward for even one rare successful trial generates enough
revenue to support the costs of all the failures.”344 Essentially, “new for the
sake of new” is enough to make money; better doesn’t matter very much.
In many circumstances, we know that it doesn’t matter whether a new
biomedical technology is better than earlier technologies for a rather
simple, if depressing, reason: No one bothers to find out. If innovators
were especially concerned with how a new technology surpassed an old
technology, we would expect to see extensive studies demonstrating that
superiority. Wouldn’t drug companies want to show their new drugs are
superior? But for many biomedical technologies, we have no such evidence.345 FDA requires only evidence of safety and eﬃcacy, although some
340. See supra Part II.
341. See supra section IV.A.1; see also Fargen et al., supra note 304, at 272 (noting “the
financial incentive for manufacturers to develop new devices via the 510(k) clearance process with only minor improvements”).
342. See supra section IV.B.
343. See generally Vinay Prasad, Christopher McCabe & Sham Mailankody, Low-Value
Approvals and High Prices Might Incentivize Ineffective Drug Development, 15 Nature Revs.
Clinical Oncology 399, 399 (2018) (describing how ineﬀective drugs can prove profitable).
344. Id.
345. See, e.g., Harvey V. Fineberg, Foreword to Comm. on Comparative Eﬀectiveness
Research Prioritization, Inst. of Medicine, Initial National Priorities for Comparative
Effectiveness Research, at xiii (2009), https://www.multiplechronicconditions.org/assets/pdf/
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have argued that approving me-too drugs should require a demonstration
of superiority.346 Comparative effectiveness research, which explicitly determines which of multiple interventions works better, is still relatively rare;
when it does happen, especially in the United States, it is largely pursued
by government or nonprofit actors.347 Drug developers, it seems, are more
worried about the possibility that their product might be inferior than they
are driven by the possibility of showing that their products are superior—
a showing they demonstrably do not need for market success.348
V. INTERVENTIONS
This Essay has argued both a broader and a narrower point. On the
broad side, divergent innovation, driven in part by the patent system,
comes with a set of costs, including shallower knowledge, compatibility
problems, and the costs of inventing around. These costs should be part
of the calculus that policymakers undertake or academics explore when
considering how to use policy levers to shape ongoing innovation. It is
hard to know ex ante the right combination of deepening, diﬀerentiating,
and exploring innovation. But getting the right balance from a policy
standpoint is exceptionally hard if policymakers and academics leave out
a key piece of the picture.
On the narrow side, biomedical innovation faces a special set of challenges: Combining patent law’s incentives for divergent innovation with
FDA and insurance reimbursement incentives against divergence can lead
to diﬀerentiating innovation that involves many of the costs of divergence
with few of its benefits (in particular, those that might arise from exploring
innovation). The broader issue demands less a solution than an acknowledgement and ongoing attention. But the narrower issue—costly diﬀerentiating innovations in biomedical innovation—could be addressed by
more targeted policy interventions. This section does not try to explore
these interventions exhaustively; any one could be the subject of its own

Comparative%20Effectiveness%20Research/iom-cer-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZG9B-A94W]
(“[F]or want of appropriate studies, innumerable practical decisions facing patients and
doctors every day do not rest on a solid foundation . . . about what constitutes the best choice
of care.”).
346. See, e.g., Gagne & Choudry, supra note 173, at 712 (calling for FDA to require
superiority for approval once a generic exists in a drug class).
347. See, e.g., Institute for Clinical & Economic Review, http://www.icer-review.org
[https://perma.cc/7QVE-5KEB] (last visited Oct. 17, 2019); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg
& W. Nicholson Price II, Promoting Healthcare Innovation on the Demand Side, 4 J.L. &
Biosciences 3, 16–18 (2017) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Price, Demand Side] (describing the
possibility and desirability of comparative eﬀectiveness research by insurers and other
health payers and noting the relative scarcity of such eﬀorts); id. at 44–45 (describing the
establishment of the Patient Centered Outcomes Research Institute to conduct comparative
eﬀectiveness research).
348. See Eisenberg & Price, Demand Side, supra note 347, at 18.
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Essay. Instead, this section briefly canvasses four possibilities: two within
the patent system and two outside it.
A.

Inside the Patent System

Within the patent system, two potential areas of doctrine suggest possibilities for change: nonobviousness, in which biomedical technologies
encounter lower bars to patentability than other areas, and utility, which
across the board has no requirement for market superiority or desirability—but which could.
1. Nonobviousness. — Nonobviousness doctrine provides a lever to
promote exploring innovation over diﬀerentiating innovation. Theoretically, it should reduce incentives for much diﬀerentiating innovation by
denying patents to the resulting inventions. Nevertheless, as described
above, the nonobviousness requirement applies less strongly to biopharmaceutical innovation than elsewhere.349
Tightening nonobviousness doctrine in the fields of biotechnology
and pharmaceuticals could encourage more exploring innovation in those
fields. A first step would be abandoning rigid “lead compound analysis”350
to accept the more flexible approach to nonobviousness reiterated by the
Supreme Court in KSR v. Teleflex.351 Being more willing to follow an
“obvious-to-try” analysis—that is, asking whether compounds were within
the realm of what medicinal chemists would be likely to try—would also
raise the threshold of nonobviousness.352 To be sure, contemporary nonobviousness doctrine has its own challenges, including diﬃculty in
administration.353 And increasing the nonobviousness threshold wouldn’t
directly create incentives for exploring innovation. But it would reduce the
patent-provided incentives for diﬀerentiating innovation while leaving
them intact for exploring innovation, making the latter a more attractive
approach.
Raising the nonobviousness bar isn’t an uncontroversial solution for
biopharmaceutical innovation.354 An obvious response,355 drawing on the
349. See supra section II.A.2.
350. See supra notes 88–96 and accompanying text.
351. 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007).
352. See Eisenberg, Pharma’s Nonobvious Problem, supra note 87, at 402, 407
(criticizing the Federal Circuit’s unwillingness to apply “obvious-to-try” logic).
353. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Nonobviousness: A Comment on Three
Learned Papers, 12 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 431, 433–37 (2008) (summarizing and extending
scholars’ takes on the indeterminacy of the obviousness requirement); Daralyn J. Durie &
Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 989, 990 (2008) (“It is also perhaps the most vexing doctrine to apply, in significant
part because the ultimate question of obviousness has an ‘I know it when I see it’ quality
that is hard to break down into objective elements.”).
354. Notably, since the diﬀerence in nonobviousness is less stark when applied to medical devices, the doctrine provides less of an opportunity for positive change there.
355. Ha!
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work of Benjamin Roin, is that novelty and nonobviousness both already
do too much to limit the field of available drugs for pharmaceutical
development.356 Roin would prefer more deepening innovation of the type
that patent law does not reward now: research on known compounds to
demonstrate that they really work as drugs.357 Raising the nonobviousness
threshold would cut in the opposite direction, improving one problem
(relatively high incentives for unhelpful diﬀerentiating innovation) but
not another (absent incentives for deepening invention). The absence of
incentives for deepening innovation cuts at the heart of the newness
driving the patent system and would require either substantial revamping
of patent law358 or turning to other incentives to address.359
Better enforcing the on-the-books doctrinal requirement of nonobviousness would help to ensure that the new drugs we get are really
diﬀerent, which helps address at least some of the problems described
above.360 Nonobviousness can only be a partial lever because, among other
things, it largely focuses on technical diﬃculty rather than social benefits
or outcomes, which are the results of greater concern in this Essay.361
2. Utility. — Utility doctrine provides another potential avenue for
reform within the patent system. If part of the problem is that we want
better but we get new, maybe patentability should require superiority.362

356. Roin, Upatentable Drugs, supra note 2, at 505.
357. See id. at 541–42.
358. See generally, e.g., Benjamin N. Roin, The Case for Tailoring Patent Awards Based
on Time-to-Market, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 672 (2014); Sichelman, supra note 37 (proposing
commercialization patents).
359. See, e.g., Hemel & Ouellette, Beyond the Debate, supra note 41, at 375–81
(arguing for combining innovation policy levers); Price, Grants, supra note 14, at 41–63
(describing ways grants can be deployed as a useful innovation incentive).
360. One might worry that me-too drugs have some use in reducing prices, or that drugs
with minor technical diﬀerences might have substantially diﬀerent results, and that a
strengthened obviousness requirement might limit their development too much. In
response, one could imagine an obviousness-type double-patenting bar that applies within
a class of drugs. Under such an approach, me-too drugs could still be patented—but their
patent term would expire (with a terminal disclaimer) at the same time as the first-in-class
drug. The contours of such an approach would need some thought to work out in detail
and are beyond the scope of this Essay. See generally Douglas L. Rogers, Double Patenting:
Follow-On Pharmaceutical Patents that Suppress Competition, 14 Nw. J. Tech. & Intell.
Prop. 317 (2017) (analyzing pharmaceutical double patents). Thanks to Mark Lemley for
this suggestion.
361. See Merges, Commercial Success, supra note 109, at 812 (describing nonobviousness as measuring technical achievement). Commercial success is a secondary indicium
of nonobviousness. See id. at 823–28 (describing the commercial success factor); id. at 842–
52 (criticizing the use of commercial success). But as described above, commercial success
is only a weak indication that a biomedical technology is worthwhile. See supra notes 11–12
and accompanying text.
362. For a contrary view, see Seymore, Making Patents Useful, supra note 107, at 1071–
80 (arguing that the utility requirement should be abolished wholesale).
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Perhaps utility could get us there—should we just overrule Justice Story in
Lowell v. Lewis?363
Probably not. There is a reason that patent law doesn’t require more
than that an invention have some use (and even the practical utility requirement as it exists now is controversial).364 The basic idea that the market
should determine which inventions are worthwhile and which are not is
mostly right—as long as there is a market that actually performs that role.
The problem with biomedical inventions and the utility requirement is
that the market doesn’t work very well, for many reasons we’ve seen, to
perform that function. FDA review helps; it evaluates whether a biomedical invention works at all, a task that the market is especially bad at accomplishing, and that the Federal Circuit’s predecessor court recognized
should lie with FDA and not the utility doctrine.365 But neither FDA nor
the market does a good job letting purchasers decide which biomedical
innovations are better.
Nevertheless, that dynamic doesn’t hold as well in other markets, where
Justice Story’s logic is more powerful and we can rely more heavily on
consumers and other purchasers to ensure that better technology wins out.366
And patent law is (mostly) technology-neutral, so that raising the utility
bar would also impact other industries and create problems.367 As discussed above, it’s also quite diﬃcult to know and to evaluate utility at the
time of patent filing.368 Changing utility, while a prima facie attractive solution to the problem of innovations that are not actually better, is unlikely
to work in practice.

363. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
364. Timing issues are also problematic, though potential solutions exist. See supra
section II.A.3.
365. See In re Hartop, 311 F.2d 249, 257–58 (C.C.P.A. 1962) (rejecting the Patent
Oﬃce’s requirements for evidence of safety in human trials as a condition of patentability
because such a requirement is committed to FDA); Seymore, Making Patents Useful, supra
note 107, at 1058 (discussing the case’s place in the evolution of the utility requirement).
366. Naturally, this doesn’t always work, and history is littered with discarded Betamax
tapes describing technologically superior innovations that nonetheless lost in the market.
And, as Risch describes, the costs of worthless patents merely existing (and thus their value)
can be large. Risch, supra note 106, at 1224–28; see also Robin Feldman & W. Nicholson
Price II, Patent Trolling: Why Bio and Pharmaceuticals Are at Risk, 17 Stan. Tech. L. Rev.
773, 776 (2014) (arguing that patent assertion entities are likely to become more active in
the biopharmaceutical space).
367. See Burk & Lemley, Policy Levers, supra note 84, at 1576–77 (“In theory, then, we
have a uniform patent system that provides technology-neutral protection to all kinds of
innovation.”). But see id. at 1577 (“In practice the rules actually applied to diﬀerent industries increasingly diverge.”). The utility doctrine in particular has more bite in biomedical
innovations than in other technological areas. Id. at 1645–46. But the diﬀerence is that it
already applies more strongly in those areas because of the nature of biomedical research
and the desire to patent inventions especially early. Requiring even greater utility just for
biomedical innovations would be a substantial step further.
368. See supra section II.A.3.
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Outside the Patent System

A separate set of interventions could involve law outside the patent
system. FDA regulation and insurer reimbursement cause problematic
interactions with patent incentives, but each of those areas also provides
possible points of intervention.369 In general, interventions to improve the
market for health technology could bring us closer to Story’s story of marketplaces solving the problem of worthless (or at least not better) technologies.370 There are many ways this could work; two illustrative avenues for
change involve altering how FDA regulation and insurer reimbursement
work for biomedical innovation.
1. FDA Approval. — FDA exerts pressure toward diﬀerentiating intervention, and it does so in a way that makes sense: It is easier to evaluate a
technology if the technology is familiar. There is a reason the 510(k) pathway exists; FDA’s regulatory knowledge is cumulative just like innovation
can be. Trying to increase regulatory burdens when easier paths are
available would be counterproductive, especially in an area already known
for high regulatory overhead.
But we could imagine an approach in which FDA required that new
technologies demonstrate improvement over old technologies in the same
class in order to be approved. For instance, before approving a new statin,
FDA might require its sponsor to demonstrate its superiority to existing
approved statins. This would likely push innovators toward exploring innovation, or at least away from diﬀerence solely for the sake of diﬀerence.
Such an intervention would face substantial challenges. First, FDA
probably lacks the statutory authority to institute superiority requirements
for approval.371 Second, implementing a requirement for superiority would
be quite complex and would create additional uncertainty in the drug
development process, since improvement is often unknown until later in

369. This is not a complete list of possible interventions, which could span many areas
of law and policy. Grants, for example, could be used to provide resources for the development of deepening innovation about drug manufacturing or new uses for old drugs, or
to develop infrastructural resources to make that sort of research easier. See, e.g., Price,
Grants, supra note 14, at 42–49, 59–63; cf. Price & Rai, supra note 310, at 1056–59 (describing government-led eﬀorts to increase innovation in biologics manufacturing technology).
370. See supra notes 103–104 and accompanying text.
371. I say “probably” because the agency has historically been creative about finding
statutory authority for its initiatives, and even before gaining the authority in 1962 to
evaluate drugs for eﬃcacy, FDA routinely folded eﬃcacy into the requirement that new
drugs be safe. See Daniel Carpenter, Reputation and Power: Organizational Image and
Pharmaceutical Regulation at the FDA 115–16, 120–21 & n.3 (Ira Katznelson, Martin Shefter
& Theda Skocpol eds., 2014). Similarly, one could imagine FDA folding “improvement” into
the concept of “eﬃcacy” or “safety,” perhaps because existing drugs have known safety
profiles and some improvement would be needed to justify the uncertainty of a new therapy.
That imagining is beyond the scope of this Essay.
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that process and can be diﬃcult to define operationally.372 Third and
finally, this type of approach goes rather strongly against the current (controversial) zeitgeist of getting FDA out of the business of telling patients
which technologies they can and can’t access once they’ve been demonstrated to be safe.373
An intermediate and more feasible approach could borrow from the
interaction between patent law and FDA and help resolve the timing problem in utility mentioned above. For instance, enforcing patents on drugs
could require a certification from FDA that the drug be clinically superior
to earlier approved products in the class. Dmitry Karshtedt has suggested
an approach along these lines in the limited context of product-hopping,
arguing that comparative eﬀectiveness research data either be added to a
drug’s labeling (or replaced by the fact that the company couldn’t be bothered to generate such data),374 or that listing of a patent in the Orange
Book—which confers quite a bit of power on the patent—be dependent
on such a showing.375 This approach would create incentives to demonstrate superiority, ensuring that divergent innovation brings the benefit of
progress. This regime would have the benefit that nonsuperior drugs
could still be approved and available on the market—they just would not
receive the additional ex post exclusivity (and hence, ex ante incentives)
provided by the patent system. In fact, FDA already plays a parallel role for
biologics, which cannot receive FDA-mediated market exclusivity if they
are variants of another approved biologic unless the sponsor demonstrates
that the variation is an improvement.376 Extending this treatment to the
patent system by tying enforcement to FDA review for improvement provides an intriguing possibility for reducing some of the costs of divergent
innovation.
2. Payer Reimbursement. — Finally, although fixing the market for
health technologies generally would be a heavy lift,377 we could inspire health
372. See Dmitry Karshtedt, The More Things Change: Improvement Patents, Drug
Modifications, and the FDA, 104 Iowa L. Rev. 1129, 1192–94 (2019) (describing the diﬃculty
of measuring improvements in drug safety and eﬀectiveness).
373. See Trickett Wendler, Frank Mongiello, Jordan McLinn, and Matthew Bellina Right
to Try Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-176, 132 Stat. 1372 (2018) (allowing the use of experimental drugs by certain patients); Holly Fernandez Lynch, Patricia J. Zettler & Ameet
Sarpatwari, Promoting Patient Interests in Implementing the Federal Right to Try Act, 320
JAMA 869, 869–70 (2018) (offering suggestions for implementing the Act); Patricia J. Zettler,
Pharmaceutical Federalism, 92 Ind. L.J. 845, 881–85 (2017) (describing right-to-try laws
generally).
374. Karshtedt, supra note 372, at 1194–98.
375. Id. at 1202–05.
376. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C)(ii) (2012) (stating that FDA-enforced data and marketing exclusivity are not available for any later application by the biologic sponsor that covers
certain nonstructural modifications or structural modifications “that do[] not result in a
change in safety, purity, or potency”).
377. See Michelle M. Mello, What Makes Ensuring Access to Aﬀordable Prescription
Drugs the Hardest Problem in Health Policy?, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 2273, 2288–98 (2018)
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insurers and other payers to encourage innovation to be better, rather
than new.378 Again, it makes sense that administrative hurdles are higher
to win approval for exploring innovations than diﬀerentiating innovation;
insurers, too, become familiar with existing technology. To make those
hurdles worth overcoming—that is, to move away from the unhappy medium of diﬀerentiating innovation—payers would need to tie reimbursement more closely to performance. Payers could refuse to pay (or to pay
more) for technologies unless the new technology presents a demonstrable improvement over existing technologies.
That payers in general don’t already do this more is something of a
mystery, and reflects some of the market perversities in health care:
patients demand specific drugs; the “consumer” is split between payers,
patients, and doctors; and costs can be passed around between diﬀerent
actors.379 That Medicare specifically doesn’t take comparative eﬀectiveness
into account when making coverage decisions is much less surprising; CMS
faces strict legal limits on how it can use such research.380 Similarly, CMS is
limited in how it can price drugs. Medicare Part D plans (the plans that
cover outpatient prescription drugs) are administered by contractors, and
the government is prohibited from centrally negotiating drug prices, leaving the task to those individual Medicare Part D plan administrators.381
But not everywhere follows this path. Payers in many other countries
do demand comparative-eﬀectiveness and cost-eﬀectiveness data before
agreeing to pay for new biomedical technologies, sometimes limiting new
therapies to the prices of existing therapies (or refusing to pay for them)
if no additional clinical benefit is shown.382 U.S. payers could follow suit.
(describing the market factors contributing to the problems with fixing prescription drug
prices in the United States).
378. To the extent that payers defray the individual impact of costs that are artificially
high because of the novelty-promoting incentives of patent law, they may already help to
reduce allocative ineﬃciencies created by those incentives, even if other novelty costs
continue. See Daniel J. Hemel & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Innovation Policy Pluralism, 128
Yale L.J. 544, 559–63, 593–601 (2019) (describing the potential disconnect between innovation incentives and allocative ineﬃciencies and oﬀering policy mechanisms, including
subsidies, to address the latter).
379. Eisenberg & Price, Demand Side, supra note 347, at 26–39 (describing legal and
economic hurdles that prevent payers from playing a “a larger role in healthcare innovation”); see also Mello, supra note 377, at 2288–98 (describing market factors and perverse
incentives in the pharmaceutical market); Sachs, Delinking Reimbursement, supra note
319, at 2311–21 (explaining the link between FDA approval and CMS reimbursement and
that private insurers often follow the lead of public payers).
380. 42 U.S.C. § 1320e-1 (2012) (prohibiting CMS from establishing a dollar-per-qualityadjusted-life-year threshold for coverage and creating other limitations).
381. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-111(i); see also Mello, supra note 377, at 2299–300 (describing
these dynamics).
382. See, e.g., Ariel D. Stern, Felicitas Pietrulla, Annika Herr, Aaron S. Kesselheim &
Ameet Sarpatwari, The Impact of Price Regulation on the Availability of New Drugs in
Germany, 38 Health Aﬀ. 1182, 1182–83 (2019) (summarizing a German law that limits new
drug prices based on an assessment of their clinical benefit); What We Do, Nat’l Inst. for
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Growing eﬀorts at value-based pricing for pharmaceuticals are in this
vein.383 Even Medicare leaves some room for this. Medicare Part D plans
must cover all drugs within six protected classes—but outside those classes
they must cover only two drugs per class, leaving room for choice based on
real eﬀectiveness.384 Nevertheless, Medicare drug pricing rules complicate
eﬀorts to move forward, though the specifics are outside the scope of this
Essay.385 In Germany, where prices for new drugs are limited if the drugs
fail to show clinical improvement over existing therapies, drugs without
such improvement were much more likely to leave the market than drugs
that really made a diﬀerence, and in any case, they weren’t reimbursed at
a premium relative to older therapies.386 And it turns out that many new
drugs did not, in fact, show improvement.387 If U.S. payers—Medicare or
not—more widely refused to pay or pay more for new therapies that were
just new-for-the-sake-of-new and not actually better, incentives to develop
such therapies would decrease.
CONCLUSION
Patent law promotes new, diﬀerent technology, and that is generally
seen as a good thing. But it is not only good. There is a dark side to novelty.
When patent law pushes inventors across the board to diverge from what
has come before, society faces costs from that divergence, ranging from
the eﬀort of inventing around to the problem of systems that are not
interoperable to the decrease of expertise. These costs may at times exceed
the benefits created by novel technologies—but patent law does not take
this point into consideration. Perhaps it shouldn’t—but we should. When
setting innovation policy, policymakers should recognize that patent law
will drive unbridled novelty.

Health & Care Excellence, https://www.nice.org.uk/about/what-we-do [https://perma.cc/
6P9L-RZ2G] (last visited Oct. 17, 2019) (describing a U.K. organization that determines
pricing and access to new health technologies).
383. See Leemore S. Dafny, Christopher J. Ody & Matthew A. Schmitt, Undermining
Value-Based Purchasing—Lessons from the Pharmaceutical Industry, 375 New Eng. J. Med.
2013, 2013–15 (2016) (describing industry strategies for resisting value-based purchasing);
Anna Kaltenboeck & Peter B. Bach, Value-Based Pricing for Drugs: Theme and Variations,
319 JAMA 2165, 2165–66 (2018) (describing different forms of value-based pricing); Elizabeth
Seeley, Susan Chimonas & Aaron S. Kesselheim, Can Outcomes-Based Pharmaceutical
Contracts Reduce Drug Prices in the US? A Mixed Methods Assessment, 46 J.L. Med. &
Ethics 952, 958–59 (2018) (finding mixed evidence of success in value-based pricing and
noting CMS’s apparent willingness to pursue value-based pricing strategies).
384. 42 C.F.R. § 423.120(b)(2)(vi) (2018).
385. See generally Rachel Sachs, Nicholas Bagley & Darius N. Lakdawalla, Innovative
Contracting for Pharmaceuticals and Medicaid’s Best-Price Rule, 43 J. Health Pol. Pol’y &
L. 5 (2018) (describing this interaction).
386. Stern et al., supra note 382, at 1185.
387. Beate Wieseler, Natalie McGauran & Thomas Kaiser, New Drugs: Where Did We
Go Wrong and What Can We Do Better?, 366 BMJ 1, 2 (2019).
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Policymakers should also recognize that, for biomedical innovation in
particular, patent law’s incentives for divergence fit within a complex
ecosystem of other incentives that may push innovation not to diverge—
with sometimes problematic results. Two of those other incentives, FDA
approval and insurer reimbursement, are particularly salient in the context of biomedical technology. Considering how these diﬀerent incentives
work together to shape the development of new technology is a complex
but crucial task that demands continuing scholarly attention.
One potential avenue for future work within the biomedical sphere
would question the temporal eﬀect of diﬀerent incentives for and against
divergent innovation. Some incentives are clustered around the beginning
of the research process; grants and publications are typically more relevant
to basic research and early-stage work. Other incentives tend to occur
later—reimbursement questions and FDA approval arise once a technology has already been developed (though, of course, savvy developers
should be thinking of these issues very early in the development process,
and at least some are). Patents come into play somewhere in the middle,
though their influence stretches across the development process. Notably,
all three of the earlier incentives are at least partially oriented toward
divergent innovation, and both later incentives promote divergent innovation. Does this timeline make sense for innovation, or does it stunt the
growth and adoption of new biomedical technologies?
An orthogonal set of inquiries would look more deeply into divergent
innovation in industries outside biomedicine. This piece has laid out a
framework for patent law’s promotion of divergent innovation and has explored in depth the costs of such divergence in the biomedical context—
as well as some complicating factors from other incentives. Other fields are
diﬀerent.
While a full exploration of diﬀerences between fields with respect to
divergent innovation must await future work, a few points come to mind.
First, the relative strength of patents in providing incentives for divergent
innovation will be diﬀerent in other industries. Information technology,
for instance, tends to move much faster than biomedicine, and much
faster than patent life cycles; divergent innovation may be driven more by
product diﬀerentiation theories than patent law.388 For many types of software, patents are likely unavailable under recent § 101 subject-matter
jurisprudence.389 In nonbiomedical fields in which patents are important,
the nonobviousness requirement’s comparatively greater strength (relative

388. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. See generally Colleen V. Chien, Of
Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of High-Tech
Patents, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1571 (2009) (discussing litigation behavior in high-tech patents);
Cohen & Lemley, supra note 30 (discussing software patents).
389. See Laura R. Ford, Patenting the Social: Alice, Abstraction, & Functionalism in
Software Patent Claims, 14 Cardozo Pub. L. Pol’y & Ethics J. 259, 304–16 (2016) (discussing
recent patentable subject matter cases with respect to computers and software).
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to pharmaceuticals) should push for more exploring over diﬀerentiating
innovation.390
Second and relatedly, markets hopefully work better outside the health
technology sector. Most goods are not credence goods, and in most markets the consumer is a single entity rather than a doctor/patient/insurer
hybrid. Where markets function better, they should be able to discipline
unhelpful and nonimproving divergent innovation, giving more truth to
Justice Story’s admonition in Lowell v. Lewis.391 If consumers can easily
identify inferior products (or nonsuperior but higher-priced products)
and avoid them, patents on those products will not provide much incentive
for innovation.
Third, however, to reiterate this Essay’s broader argument, the existence and types of divergent innovation costs are generalizable across
technologies, even if the examples given here are biomedical. Inventing
around, lack of interoperability, and shallow knowledge/spread expertise
are technology-agnostic. The cost of working around others’ patents is the
entire rationale behind the (contested but voluminous) literature on
patent hold-up, which occurs more frequently in nonbiomedical industries.392 Patented, incompatible electronic connections limit interoperability between diﬀerent systems.393 And anyone who has had to shift from one
software platform to another, and found everything irritatingly diﬀerent,
knows firsthand the issue of nontransferable expertise.
Fourth and finally, diﬀerent industries will face diﬀerent intersecting
nonpatent regimes. FDA does not regulate (most) software, and insurance
reimbursement is typically not an issue for consumer goods. Thus, the
intersection highlighted here, and its unhappy medium of new-for-thesake-of-new diﬀerentiating innovation, may be a less frequent outcome in
diﬀerent fields. But other regimes may play parallel roles, whether they be
regulators, such as the Environmental Protection Agency or the Federal
Aviation Agency in pesticides and airplanes, or procurement systems with
their own limits, such as the Department of Defense for military technology. Again, the specifics must await future work.
More generally, questions of deepening, diﬀerentiating, and exploring innovation could apply across creative fields beyond technological
innovation. Intellectual property privileges what is new and diﬀerent—
even in instances in which consumers may or may not benefit from that

390. See supra section II.A.2 (discussing nonobviousness, including in the pharmaceutical context).
391. See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
392. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, Holding Up and Holding Out, 21 Mich. Telecomm. &
Tech. L. Rev. 1, 9–20 (2014) (laying out the hold-up theory). But see id. at 20–26 (describing
an alternate perspective); id. at 30–34 (critiquing the hold-up theory).
393. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 225, at 1965–69 (discussing patented and
incompatible interfaces in videogames, voice over IP, and early modem technologies).
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newness.394 Like the intellectual property system’s reliance on price to set
rewards, and on exclusivity to implicitly determine what can be protected,
its prioritization of diﬀerence shapes the kind of knowledge and creative
eﬀort that creators put forth. Across various contexts, we should take into
account the costs of divergence and consider how we can drive the creation that is not just new—but also deeper and better.

394. See, e.g., Buccafusco et al., supra note 22, at 41–46 (describing diﬀerent consumer
tastes for novelty in diﬀerent creative fields). Compare Jeanne C. Fromer, A Psychology of
Intellectual Property, 104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1441, 1472–74 (2010) (describing relatively easy
acceptance of substantially new technologies in science), with id. at 1479–83 (describing
that in creative arts, successful works are typically not too diﬀerent from what has come
before).
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